VALUE, NOTHINGNESS AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

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ABSTRACT

The term "value" is taken here to refer to that being which forms the ontological basis of all varieties of value predication. The argument of the dissertation presupposes that value is real. The objective is to determine what metaphysical terms and structures are necessary that this assumption might be justified. Two separate analyses are undertaken. In the first an attempt is made to isolate those metaphysical terms necessary for the being of value. In dealing with this first analysis, two realms are discussed, the linguistic and the metaphysical. In the second analysis Sartre's ontology is critically analyzed in an effort to determine how these terms must be structured and related that value might have being.

An analysis of the usage of value predication leads one to the conclusion that, since it is reasonable for two individuals to use contradictory value predications while agreeing about the facts, the being of value cannot be reduced to a species of characteristic of objects or to an effect caused in the subject by an object. The result of the metaphysical analysis is that it is impossible for values to have an explainable existence in a rationalistic

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metaphysic.

The explainable existence of value in a metaphysic depends upon the reality of radical diversity and change. Radical diversity and change are necessary in objectivity that the polarity and directedness in the structure of value taken as a whole might find their ground in reality. They are also necessary in subjectivity that it might act as the source of value. An analysis of the arguments of Parmenides shows that the reality of radical diversity and change depend upon an ontological status for nothingness. However, nothingness is inadmissable into a metaphysical structure without at the same time admitting creativity.

For Sartre the creative agent is being-for-itself. Its creative act is that of constituting being-in-itself as the human situation. Being-for-itself is consciousness and consciousness is intentionality. As pure intentionality being-for-itself is empty. Thus, with respect to essence it is nothingness. Being-in-itself is the being of phenomena, the object of intention.

Being-for-itself constitutes being-in-itself as the ground of value by creating its determinateness. Determinateness is the 'this' taken against the totality. Being-in-itself made determinate by being-for-itself is a proper ground for value, since it admits to a radical diversity and change. Being-for-itself chooses a particular possibility as its end from the absolutely undifferentiated ultimate possibility which is an aspect of its own being. In so doing value comes into being. The chosen end is a thing of intrinsic value. The contingent circumstances of being-for-itself's relationship with being-in-itself, that is, its facticity, provide the ground for extrinsic valuation.

There are two aspects to creativity. The negative aspect is its lack of a determinate relationship to prior being. The positive aspect is its relationship to the novelty which it brings into being. By structuring being-for-itself as nothingness with respect to essence, Sartre has adequately provided for the negative aspect of creativity. But in his account of the structure of being-for-itself there is no account of the positive aspect of creativity. Yet the positive aspect is necessary in order to account for the creation of determinateness and value. 147

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CHAPTER I

VALUES

The field of value theory is a complex one. This complexity is due to the wide range of its issues. It is imperative, therefore, that one isolate that particular issue to which he is addressing himself. There will be no attempt here made to deal with questions particular to the fields of aesthetics or ethics. This essay is concerned with value per se. Further, since the issue to be considered is a metaphysical one, many questions arising from philosophy's empiricistic and linguistic traditions will not be considered.

What, then, is the issue? The concern of this essay is the ontological status of value. What is being sought is the ontological complex of elements in which value finds its being in its most abstract form. The analysis of value to be undertaken in this essay, therefore, must have as its foundation a complete metaphysical system. This essay will defer critically to Sartre's phenomenological ontology for that system. However, it will be profitable to consider some of the issues involved in the construction of any such metaphysical system. The present chapter and the one which follows will deal with these issues.

An objection might be raised at this point. Some value theorists take the position that all axiological issues can be resolved in an analysis of human interaction and conclude from this that philosophy need not be concerned with ontology in dealing with value theory, but only with logical and linguistic considerations, all other considerations being left to the psychologist and anthropologist. In answering such an objection, the question of the possibility of doing metaphysics must first be set aside. If metaphysics is possible, then it is clear that human interaction provides not only ground for psychological and anthropological speculation, but also metaphysical speculation as well. Value theories of this type do not eliminate the significance of the question of the ontological status of value, but only make the metaphysical assumption that the being of value is a function of human being.

I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Largely because of the diversity of issues in the field of value theory, there is a wide divergence in the ways philosophers use the term "value." The various uses of the term are differentiated according to that to which they refer. It will be of no small help to determine precisely which usage is most appropriate to this discussion. If the appropriate usage can be determined, a better understanding can be gained of exactly what it is that is provoking the question of the ontological status of value.

The term value is used in philosophy either 1) as a verb or 2) as a noun. As a verb the term may be used a) to indicate the act of evaluation, meaning "to rank on a scale of good and bad," or b) to indicate the act of valuation. Valuation has two possible meanings: i) "to hold dear" and ii) "to create a value for an entity." In this last usage the verb "value" refers to the act of creation on the part of some subjective being, human or divine, through which a predicate, such as "is good" or "is beautiful," is applied to some entity. As a noun "value" may be used a) to refer to entities valued or b) to indicate value categories, such as goodness or beauty. When referring to entities, "value" may intend objects which i) are valued by persons or ii) ought to be valued. When used to refer to value categories, "value" may indicate i) only goodness and badness or ii) a whole spectrum of value categories, such as beauty and justice.[1]

The actions indicated by the term "value" for the most part do not provide the ground most directly for the question of the ontological status of value. "Value," defined as the act of holding dear, is used to express a fact about an individual, and it is not simply the ontological complex which grounds this fact that is in question. "Value," defined as the act of ranking, is equally inappropriate. The act of judgment does not call forth the ontological question here intended. The criterion upon which such judgments are made might well precipitate such a question, but it would confuse the issue to question that criterion in the context of the act of human judgment.

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[1] Most but not all of these philosophical uses of the term "value" can be found in William K. Frankena, "Value and Valuation," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), VIII, 229-232.

A completely different situation is met in considering the final use of "value" taken as a verb. It may be the case that value can be said to have ontological status through an act of creation. The difficulty is, however, that this use takes one to a conclusion of the issue, not its starting point.[2] To accept this use of the term would be to prejudice the analysis towards a particular type of metaphysical system, when what is needed is a starting point which is totally unprejudiced.

That use of "value," the function of which is to indicate entities, is clearly not the one which provokes the question of ontological status. It is not the status of those objects which enjoy the particular position of being valued or of those which ought to be valued that is in question. Again the question of criterion is involved. There must be an objective criterion through which an object is actually valuable and there must be a criterion according to which a person chooses to value an object. But here too it would be quite inefficient to take up the question of the being of that criterion from within the context of objects.

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[2] This will, however, be the position with which this essay will conclude.

What remains is "value" used in the sense of a certain type of predication. This is the use of the term appropriate to this discussion. But there are two ways in which "value," used in this sense, may occur. It may be used as the genus for those predications "is good" and "is bad" and their direct cognates, and it may be used as the genus for a larger number of predications, including "is beautiful" and "is true," as well as "is good" and "is bad." Used in the former way it would deny richness to the being of value. In this essay, then, the term "value" shall be used in the second of these two usages.

In what way do value predicates provoke the question of the ontological status of value? The first problem that arises in the consideration of value predications is that of definition, for only through a definition can they be separated from other categories of predication. On a pre-metaphysical level the only way in which value can be defined is in terms of what Wittgenstein calls family resemblance.[3] Any pre-metaphysical definition is so limited because there is no single characteristic common to all situations in which value predicates are applicable. But a definition of this sort cannot provide a ground for precisely differentiating value predication from other forms of predication. It cannot help to determine how it is that a value predication becomes applicable to an entity. Nor can it determine the significance of value predications to human life. To provide answers to these questions, it is necessary to move onto a metaphysical level. In the context of a metaphysical system, value itself and its specific modes are found as ontological elements. This is not to say that they possess a being which is independent of other metaphysical elements, for it may well be that value finds its being in a complex of elements, as a function of one or more other beings. In any case, as an element of reality value can be defined in such a way that its specific place in reality, its relation to other elements of reality and its significance can be determined.

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[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 17.

It remains to be determined, however, how the shift can be made from value predications to value as an element of reality. As is true of any predication, statements containing value predicates assert that some state of affairs surrounds the entity about which the predication is made. In that ontological complex which grounds that state of affairs, an element must be found which is particular to the state of affairs indicated by a proposition containing a value predicate. This element is a value. Metaphysics does not concern itself with values on such a particularized level. It is more concerned with value on its most abstract level. But any analysis of value taken on an abstract level is, of course, relevant to value taken on the particularized level.

Before moving on to the metaphysical realm, it will be helpful to dwell a bit more on the meaning of value predication. A closer look at value predication will provide a clearer understanding as to what sort of ontological complex it is that contains the being of value. From the state of affairs which surrounds and justifies the use of a proposition containing a value predicate, some determination can be made as to the ontological realm or realms in which value finds its being.

From a purely grammatical standpoint the value term used in a value predicate is an adjective. In most cases in which the predicate is adjectival, it is assumed that the use of a statement containing such a predicate is justified because the subject of that statement contains a property which is indicated by the adjective. Many philosophers have assumed that this same situation surrounds statements containing value predicates. Believing this, they set themselves upon the task of finding suitable substitutes for various value predicates, substitutes which indicate more objectively what property is being indicated in the value predicate. This is, for example, what Santayana is doing when he defines beauty as pleasure taken as a characteristic of a thing.[4] If Santayana is correct, then the statement "The flower is beautiful" means literally that the flower contains pleasure in an objective mode as one of its characteristics. If this approach to value predication is correct in general, then one must look for the being of value in the same way that he approaches the being of any other property.

Charles L. Stevenson raises some serious objections to this approach. His primary concern is with those value predications which occur in ethics, but his remarks can be easily generalized. In an attempt to locate an alternative meaning for the predicate "is good," Stevenson first establishes three requirements for its definition. Any definition of goodness must leave open the possibility of disagreement as to what is good. It must also take into consideration the element of "magnetism" which is involved in statements predicating goodness, and it must account for the fact that the goodness of something is not justified solely through scientific methods.[5] Stevenson justifies the first requirement by showing that it is possible that different individuals, agreeing to the same facts, may still disagree about the goodness of some entity. The second he justifies by showing that people use statements containing the predications of goodness in attempts to alter the attitudes of others. The final requirement is justified by showing that no test can be run which would justify any particular claim of goodness and refute its contrary.

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[4] George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), p. 31.

[5] Charles L. Stevenson, Facts and Values (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 13-15.

Stevenson leans heavily upon what he calls the dynamic use of language and the emotive meaning of words in his discussion of the meaning of goodness. Basically, he accepts the interest theory. According to this theory, goodness is defined as that in which one has an interest. But, for Stevenson, this is only a partially relevant definition, for it fails to meet the requirements he lays down.[6] In order to correct the definition, one has to take account of the fact that the predication of goodness is not descriptive in intent, but dynamic. Words are dynamic, for Stevenson, if their use is primarily that of persuasion. The dynamic use of words depends to a great extent upon the emotive meaning of the words. Stevenson concludes from this that there is no term which can be used to replace "goodness," because no term has an emotive meaning identical with it.[7] If Stevenson's analysis is correct, it follows that it is not the being of a special type of property which is the objective of the present ontological search.

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[6] *Ibid*., p. 12.

From a methodological point of view Stevenson can be criticised for his unargued assumption of a behavioristic and anthropocentric ground for dealing with value. The reason he feels free to make these assumptions is because he belongs to a philosophical tradition which does not accept the value or possibility of metaphysics. For purposes of this essay, however, an examination of these assumptions is necessary.

On a metaphysical level, the assertion that the use of statements containing value predicates is intelligible solely from within the context of human attitudes is certainly a debatable one. A Christian, for example, might well discover an occasion for using a statement containing a value predicate to express what he believes to be a value for God, a value which he, nevertheless, cannot bring himself to share. According to Stevenson's analysis, such a statement is meaningless because it does not express a human attitude. But, if there is a God, and if he does have attitudes towards the elements of his creation, then, even within the contexts of Stevenson's analysis, a statement of such attitudes ought to be meaningful. What is wrong with Stevenson's analysis is not so much that he does not allow for this particular use of value predication as that he fails to provide proof for excluding it.

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

One may wish to concede, however, that the occasions for using value predication are restricted to the human context. Even so, Stevenson can still be charged with accepting a form of behaviorism for his analysis without sufficient justification. In defining goodness Stevenson does little more than explain the circumstances which call forth the utterance of a statement containing a value predicate as a behavioral pattern and claim that its effect upon other people depends primarily upon its emotive meaning. In accepting this as the limit of his analysis, he is also accepting, *de facto*, a behavioristic context. From a metaphysical standpoint the introduction of a theory of mind or a theory of emotion would no doubt have added to the understanding of the state of affairs surrounding the occasion of value predication. In metaphysics refraining from the introduction of one of these theories would require some proof of the behavioristic thesis.

The two objections which have been raised above run completely contrary to the spirit of Stevenson's analysis. They should not be viewed, therefore, as attempts to reject his analysis, assuming the context within which he has chosen to operate, nor as an attempt to deny him that context. The point of these objections has been to show some of the directions which are still open to a metaphysical analysis, even though his judgment as to the criteria for value predication may be a correct one.

Despite his metaphysical weaknesses Stevenson does prove that goodness is not some objective quality of entities. It is true that people disagree about what is good. It is possible even to disagree with God about it. These circumstances are not consistent with those theories which make a property out of goodness. One might retort that these disagreements are due to the fact that some people are simply wrong. But, as Stevenson demonstrates, people still disagree about what is good even though they agree about the associated facts. It is also true that the element of magnetism is necessarily associated with the predication of goodness and is not necessarily so associated with those objectively determined predicates which many theorists wish to substitute for "is good." Finally, there is no objective testing procedure for determining goodness, since there is no objectively determinable state of affairs, be it a property which an object has in itself or a relationship in which that object stands to man, such as that of bringing pleasure, which is good. One must agree with Stevenson, then, that the predicate goodness is not used to express an objective state of affairs, but an attitude. The interest of this essay is not just in the value goodness, but in value in general. However, it is easy to see that Stevenson's analysis of goodness can easily be generalized.

What bearing does this conclusion have on the question of this essay? The objective of this study is to locate that ontological complex which grounds the state of affairs which surrounds the use of value predication. In this ontological complex is to be found the being of value. Therefore, since value predicates are used to express attitudes, it is to a metaphysical study of subjectivity and the mode of its relationship to what is objective that this essay must turn. This move does not commit one to the assumption that value arises out of the being of man, for there might be other structures in reality which are subjective in nature. Value, as an element in such a structure, might appear to man as something objective. Nevertheless, if the analysis presented above is correct, then it is still the case that the being of value arises out of a subjectivity.

II. VALUES IN METAPHYSICS

This discussion has reached that point at which value as a metaphysical issue can now be considered. The goal of this particular section is to determine what type of metaphysical system is necessary in order that value might be real.

For purposes of dealing with this issue, one principle for the division of metaphysical systems is appropriate. This division centers upon the place which is given to reason in a metaphysical system. Accordingly, those systems which make reason the sole principle for the structure of reality can be placed in one class and those which do not can be placed in the other. This analysis will not concern itself with particular examples of either rationalistic metaphysics or non-rationalistic metaphysics. Rather it will attempt to base its conclusions upon ideal models of each type. The bulk of the present discussion will center on rationalistic metaphysics. An attempt will be made to show that value as a real element cannot be derived from such a structure.

It will be necessary to define more precisely what a rationalistic metaphysic is. As stated above, for a rationalistic metaphysic reason provides the sole basis for the structure of reality. But the history of philosophy contains many differing accounts of the powers of reason and, therefore, it will be necessary to determine exactly what is entailed in the concept of reason as used here. The most important requirement which the present conception of reason makes upon reality is that every real entity be completely determined by an immutable essence and, further, that these essences fall under the restrictions of universality and necessity.[8] It is not sufficient to say only that each real entity has an immutable essence, for this would still permit a radical pluralism. It is necessary that these essences be found throughout a wide range of particulars and that they be structured such that they can be interrelated in universal propositions.[9] It is also necessary to assume that all relationships between such essences be intrinsically necessary relationships.[10] A second requirement which this conception of reason places upon reality is that the only principles acceptable in formulating these universal and necessary relationships are those of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle, namely, the laws of analytic reasoning. This requirement excludes principles of reason such as Hegel's principle of dialectical reason. The question for this section can now be clearly understood. Can the being of value be derived from a metaphysic which is determined solely by reason as it has been described here?

There are two possible sources of value. Value may arise out of reality taken as a whole or out of human reality. Each of these sources must be examined to see whether or not a rationalistic metaphysic can draw from it the being of value.

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[8] Arthur Berndtson, "Hegel, Reason, and Reality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XX (September, 1959), pp. 41-42.

[9] Ibid., p. 41. [10] Ibid., pp. 41-42.

The object of analysis in the former case would be either the essence of the whole of reality or that of God as its creator. In either case the inference would be of the same sort. It would move from the completeness and perfection of the whole to the necessity of the being of value. It may be maintained in a rationalistic metaphysic that, from the completeness and perfection of God or of reality taken as a whole, the actuality of goodness can be inferred. Such an inference will not be questioned here. But it must be pointed out that it is not the being of value _per se_ which is being proven. Rather, it is the fact that the world is something which is valuable. It might be argued that the same premise makes necessary the being of value in itself. In a God-centered metaphysics, for example, it might be claimed that, in the same way that his essence makes necessary the goodness of reality, so does it make necessary the being of value. But one can infer from God's essence that he creates the essence of value only if it can be established that such a creation is better than any other possible creation. But to say this is to assume an ontologically prior value, the value according to which being is more valuable if it contains the essence of value. Under such circumstances it is impossible to conceive of the being of value depending upon a creative act of God, since it has a prior uncreated status in the being of God. A similar conclusion holds for the essence of reality taken as a whole. What follows from the above analysis is that, if value has its being in a source outside man, it exists because of some divine mystery, a mystery which rationalistic metaphysics is ill equipped to handle.

It might well be the case that value comes into being only within the context of human reality. Perhaps a rationalistic metaphysic can provide the ground for value at this level. When one is concerned with reality taken as a whole or with God, he need only consider its essence. In a rationalistic metaphysic only what is implied in that essence can be concluded about reality. When one concerns himself with one element of reality, the situation becomes more complex, for it is not only that element's essence which is involved in a conclusion made about it, but also the causal relationships which hold between it and other elements. These relationships may be strictly mechanistic or they may involve the element of human purpose. Both must be considered as possible modes for man's relationship to the other elements of reality in a rationalistic metaphysic.

The term "mechanism" usually refers to a type of causality wherein the effect is produced by the motion of matter. This association of mechanism with materialism is too restrictive for the purposes of this analysis. "Mechanism" will be used here to refer to that type of causality wherein the effect is determined by the essence of the most proximate element and by the essences of those other elements which make up its situation. In mechanistic causality a present effect is brought about by the operation of the involved elements operating out of the past. Such a definition makes it possible to talk of man without examining the materialist's thesis.

In a mechanistic theory an attempt would be made to explain the being of value as a necessary reaction on the part of a man to stimuli produced by some other entity. In such a theory value is thought to be a function of the essences of man and of the object which stimulates him. But can this type of human reaction contain the being of value? Human reaction may either be overt and behavioral or internal. It is in the internal reactions that one is most likely to find valuation. For purposes of this analysis it will suffice to consider internal reaction based on a model involving only pleasure and pain, even though it is far from certain that such a limit can be placed upon internal reactions.

It is no doubt true that moral goodness and badness can be associated with pleasure and pain, but it does not follow that the former is a function of the latter. Upon inspection one discovers that the logic in which moral goodness and badness are found is distinct from that of pleasure and pain. Whereas pleasure and pain make some form of overt behavior mechanistically necessary in a rationalistic metaphysic, moral goodness and badness entail moral obligation. The two are not the same, since the possibility of duty requires freedom as a metaphysical condition of man, while the overt behavior which follows from pleasure or pain occurs out of necessity in a rationalistic metaphysic. This discussion of the relationship between pleasure and pain and moral goodness and badness is only concerned with a part of value taken as a whole and, as a result, the conclusions which can be drawn from it are somewhat limited. It may be the case that a mechanistic determination of other values is possible. However, if one is unwilling to exclude moral goodness and badness from the structure of value taken as a whole, then he must conclude that at least part of the being of value exists as a mystery.

Perhaps the being of value can arise out of the human context in a metaphysic which operates upon a telic causality within the human sphere. A telic causality is similar to mechanistic causality in that the effect is determined by the human essence and the essences of the elements which make up a particular man's situation. But in the case of telic causality a purpose for humanity must be added to his essence. The addition of this element shifts the emphasis of causation from the past to the future. Values can be said to emanate from man within such a structure. Goodness and badness, for example, may be determined by what aids and hinders the human purpose respectively. However, it must be noted that value has a being ontologically prior to its existence as an effect of human activity. The being of value is inserted into the structure of reality with the addition of the element of purpose to the human essence, for only by virtue of a prior value can human existence have a purpose contained within its immutable essence. Telic causality operating in man, then, cannot lay the ground for the being of value.

A general conclusion can now be drawn: There is no way to explain the derivation of values in a rationalistic metaphysic. Values can have a being in a rationalistic metaphysic only if they are postulated as part of the essence of God or of the essence of humanity. The same assumptions which are necessary for a rationalistic metaphysic, the appeal to immutable essences and the limitation of the laws determining the relationships among these essences, make impossible the being of value short of its assumption as an aspect of the immutable essences. These conclusions do not act as a refutation of rationalistic metaphysics, for a denial of the derivability of value is still possible. However, if one is to accept the position that the genesis of value can be explained, he must move from a rationalistic metaphysic to a non-rationalistic metaphysic.

The term "non-rationalistic" must not be taken in the wrong way. If a metaphysic is non-rationalistic, one cannot assume that in it reason has no efficacy in producing an understanding of reality nor that reality does not have a rational character contained within it in some way. A non-rationalistic metaphysic is simply a metaphysic which, in addition, admits of a non-rational character to reality. Since the above analysis had demonstrated that value cannot be derived in a rationalistic metaphysic, one must turn to a non-rationalistic metaphysic to find the derivation of value. A non-rationalistic metaphysic cannot remove the mystery which surrounds value, because it is precisely the mystery entailed in a metaphysical theory of value which makes one look beyond the ground established by a rationalistic metaphysic. What a non-rationalistic metaphysic can do, however, is to fit this mystery into an intelligible context.

One can find in the history of philosophy a number of different ways in which philosophers have attempted to produce metaphysics so as to allow for a non-rational character to reality. One of these has been to include in the metaphysical structure the concept of absolute not-being or nothingness. This method of handling such a metaphysical operation is probably the most common. A strong case can be built for the claim that the concept of nothingness, at least implicitly, is contained in any non-rationalistic metaphysic. No attempt will be here made to substantiate this claim. However, since nothingness is the concept which Sartre uses in his ontological structure, since the concept is well suited to the operation of producing a non-rationalistic metaphysic, and since a non-rationalistic metaphysic is needed to account for the being of value, it will be well to undertake an analysis of the concept of nothingness.

CHAPTER II

NOTHINGNESS

Two distinct problems must be dealt with in the present discussion. Of first concern will be absolute not-being or nothingness itself taken as an ontological term. Of secondary importance metaphysically, but of fundamental importance to the goal of this essay, is the relationship which exists between nothingness and the being of value.

I. ONTOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Two topics present themselves for discussion here. First, the importance of nothingness to a metaphysical structure must be determined. Second, the requirements for the admission of nothingness to that structure must be examined.

The concept of being may be ontologically prior to or simultaneous with that of nothingness, but never posterior to it. A proper understanding of nothingness is achieved only in conjunction with an understanding of the concept of being. The term "being" is used to refer collectively to all that exists. As used here existence is not limited to entities discoverable in time. It is used in such a way as to be appropriate to the occasion of the discovery of an entity or event in any context. Hence, in the sense of the term used here, a man's love for his wife, his body, God and a number may be said to exist. But if being is to be a useful concept in metaphysics there must be a corresponding universal in reality. Such an assertion need not set one upon the task of finding a necessary condition for being, for there may be many such. Nevertheless, it is necessary to conceive of being as a universal, since to deny it that status, would be to deny the first requirement necessary in order that the various elements of reality fit together into a structured whole. Such a structure is a necessary condition for the efficacy of synoptic metaphysics. Such a conception of being is a necessary ground for an understanding of nothingness.

The position that being is a serviceable universal is opposed by some logical empiricists. Their claim is that existence is not a predicate. If this is true then being cannot be said to have the status of a universal, the project of synoptic metaphysics must be deemed fruitless and, of course, the concept of nothingness must be meaningless. An analysis of such a claim at this point will avert confusion when the discussion turns to matters which are ontologically more complex.

William Kneale takes such a position. As he sees it, those philosophers who think that existence is a predicate are assuming that the subject-predicate relationship is a logical absolute and that, since existence is sometimes used as a grammatical predicate, it must be a logical predicate.[1] Kneale assumes that a term is a logical predicate only if it functions as such in a categorical proposition. All categorical propositions, he claims, are complex propositions. They are complex because they are truth-functionally dependent upon simple propositions. For example, a universal categorical proposition of the form "for all x, x is F," where x is a variable and F a predication, is truth-functionally dependent upon the conjunction of simple propositions of the form "b is F," where b is a particular thing.[2] For Kneale the mistake the above mentioned philosophers have made is that of treating simple propositions as categorical propositions. Certainly "b is F" logically entails "for some x, x is F," but the meaning of the two statements is quite different. The proposition "This table exists," then, is a simple statement. The categorical proposition appropriate to it is "for some x, x is a table" or "something is a table." Since existence does not find its way into the categorical proposition, Kneale concludes, it cannot be a predication.[3]

Kneale's conclusion can be avoided, however, if one is willing to accept the possibility of there being a plurality of logics. The logic out of which Kneale is operating was created by empiricists for empiricistic philosophy. The assertions made by the empiricists are precipitated upon the occasion of particular sense-experiences. The simple propositions of which Kneale speaks are appropriate to these occasions. If any categorical propositions are to be built by the empiricist, they must be grounded upon these simple propositions. The categorical propositions made in a synoptic metaphysic are not generated from this empirical basis. Then are grounded instead in certain highly abstract concepts. Categorical propositions of this latter sort, then, are not truth-functionally dependent upon simple propositions. If existence is used as a predicate in the context of a synoptic metaphysic it has a different use than its use in a proposition of empiricism. It is clearly the case that two different logics are at work here. If one is to make a judgment about whether or not existence is a predicate, he must first make a pragmatic judgment about the efficacy of empiricism and synoptic metaphysics, for the logic of one cannot be used as a criterion for judging the other.

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[1] William Kneale, "Is Existence a Predicate?," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume XV (London: Harrison and Son Ltd., 1936), p. 154.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 158-160. [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.

There will be no attempt made in this essay to produce a logic for synoptic metaphysics. Too, no attempt will be made to undertake an analysis of the pragmatic function of synoptic metaphysics. However, a survey of systems of synoptic metaphysics reveals that being, as that concept which refers to the universal under which is subsumed all things which exist, must be one of the fundamental terms in any such logic. With a clearer understanding of the function of being in synoptic metaphysics, this essay can turn its attention towards those circumstances which make necessary the introduction of the concept of nothingness.

Probably the most effective means for demonstrating the need for the concept of nothingness is from the philosophy of Parmenides. From the premise that it is possible to conceive of being and impossible to conceive of nothingness,[4] Parmenides draws the conclusion that diversity and change are impossible. Reality, Parmenides claims, must be conceived to be homogeneous, for it is inconceivable that it contain an element different than being per se. It is inconceivable because the only element which could be different from being is nothingness, an element which is itself inconceivable. Reality also must be assumed to be unchanging for Parmenides because the only reality, being, could change only if it sprang from nothingness or became nothingness. Since nothingness is inconceivable, however, it is impossible to conceive of being changing.[5]

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[4] Parmenides, "Fragment V," Parmenides, trans. by Leonardo Tarán (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 54.

Parmenides' conclusion clearly runs counter to common opinion, for the world does appear to contain diversity and change of a profound sort. A metaphysic faithful to common opinion must permit the existence of a diversity which extends beyond differentiations which separate mere modes of a single substratum to those differentiatiations which divide reality into a plurality of entities unified only by their being. Such a diversity is a radical diversity. This same metaphysic must also permit change to extend beyond mere modes of that substratum to a change in the very essence of the radically diverse entities. Such a change is a radical change. To counter common opinion, some rationalistic metaphysicians, including Parmenides, relegate diversity and change to a realm of illusion under which lies the reality. Others, including Spinoza, accomplish the same end by locating behind diversity a more fundamental homogeneity and by completely restricting change through necessary mechanistic or teleological law. In general, then, for a rationalistic metaphysic, diversity and change must be reduced to a nominal status or denied altogether.

Against all the arguments presented by rationalistic metaphysicians for the nominal status of diversity and change, Parmenides' is the clearest. For him radical diversity and change cannot be real, since the acceptance of their reality entails the granting of a prior ontological status to an inconceivable term, nothingness. Two observations may be made in light of Parmenides' argument. First, if radical diversity and change are to have a place in a metaphysic, then the metaphysical structure which accounts for their reality cannot be generated solely from the law of identity. This is not to say that, once radical diversity and change have been granted ontological status, they are not subject to this law, for to assert that the granting of ontological status to diversity and change requires a non-rational character of a metaphysic does not involve the denial of order to that change and diversity. Second, it follows from Parmenides' argument that the only way in which diversity and change can be dealt with in the context of a metaphysical structure is by granting ontological status to nothingness or by some analogous arrangement. Such a move entails, of course, the acceptance of a metaphysic with a non-rational character.

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[5] Parmenides, "Fragment VIII," Parmenides, pp. 82-86.

The argument presented thus far still remains threatened, even from within the context of synoptic metaphysics. It has often been argued that one can give a metaphysical account of radical diversity and change through the introduction of relative not-being, without at the same time admitting pure not-being or nothingness. It appears that one can account for the reality of radical diversity in the proposition "one thing which exists is not another." It also appears that one can account for radical change in the proposition "one thing which exists was not what it now is." The not-being used in these propositions is clearly a relative not-being. If relative not-being does not refer to a prior absolute not-being, then radical diversity and change can be accounted for in a rationalistic metaphysic. Relative not-being is easily accommodated by the structure of empiricism, but in order to fit it into a synoptic metaphysic, a special conception of being is required, a conception of being which gives the subject-predicate distinction ontological status, because relative not-being can only be a category of predication. Aristotle's metaphysic attempts to provide that conception. If Aristotle's analysis is correct and complete, the thesis maintained in this essay, that nothingness is necessary for diversity and change, must be put aside. Therefore, an examination of Aristotle's position must be undertaken.

Aristotle recognizes a number of senses of being.[6] Each of his categories is a type of being. The categories are the general classes of predication and, as such, provide for the reality of radical diversity and change. However, Aristotle recognized that the categories could not consume all the senses of being. Had he allowed this, his position would have been close to that of the logical empiricists. Instead, Aristotle recognizes another sense of being, the being of the subject of predication. This is the central sense of being, being qua being.[7] This is the same sense of being with which Parmenides was concerned. Being qua being, for Aristotle, is the being of substance.[8] As he sees it there are three types of substance, the sensible perishables, the sensibles which are eternal and the immovables.[9] Since both radical diversity and change are found only in the first type of substance, the attention of this essay may be limited to that type. The sensible perishables, natural substances, require for their being the presence of both matter and form.[10] It is primarily through its form that substance can become the occasion for predication. The predicate is contained in the form of the substance which functions as the subject of predication. Matter is also necessary to Aristotle's substance. Matter provides the principle of individuation and the potentiality for change. It is the matter in a particular book that permits one to distinguish it from another of the same title and edition. It is also the matter which allows one to account for the fact that, when a book is burned, it is the same being which was a book and is now ashes.

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[6] Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1003 ^{a}32-34.

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[7] *Loc. cit.*

[8] *Ibid.*, 1028 ^{a}10-30.

[9] *Ibid.*, 1069 ^{a}30-^{b}3.

[10] *Ibid.*, 1070 ^{a}9-30.

It is clear that it is matter which makes possible not-being in the relative sense. It is matter as the principle of individuation which permits the proposition "one thing which exists is not another." Certainly one thing is distinguished from another by its form, but a principle of individuation is necessary for the being of diverse forms. It is also matter as potentiality which permits the proposition "one thing which exists was not what it is now." Although here again it is the form which determines what the being's two states are, it is matter which makes it possible for one being to have two states.

But what is matter in Aristotle's metaphysic? Aristotle speaks of matter in two different ways, which are not of necessity mutually exclusive. In one sense matter is conceived as a surd. In itself it is an unintelligible reference point upon which forms are hung. But in another sense matter is identified with potentiality. If potentiality is used by Aristotle merely to indicate the passivity of matter with respect to determination by form, then the conception of matter as potentiality is consistent with the conception of matter as a surd. It is probable that this is how Aristotle intends potentiality to be conceived.[11] However, to admit matter so conceived into an ontology is to admit the existence of a mystery to logic of a bad sort. As was asserted in Chapter I, an element of mystery is necessary to a metaphysic containing a place for value. But in a metaphysic like Aristotle's, there is no way that matter can communicate with what is logically determinate. If, on the other hand, the potentiality of matter is conceived to be logically connected with the form which the matter takes, then matter cannot be conceived as a surd. This is the position which Aquinas takes. As Aquinas sees it there is a definite relationship between the potentiality of a material event and the form. One of the consequences of this conception of potentiality is that theoretically one can peel off the determinations of matter, i.e., the limits to potentiality and end up with a prime matter which is pure potentiality. But what is pure potentiality? It has no actuality and is, therefore, nothing.[12] Thus the concept of pure not-being or nothingness is discovered as a term in the ontological structure of matter-form metaphysics. What has been uncovered is a paradox in this type of metaphysic. One must either take the position that matter is a surd and take the consequences of having to admit into his ontology a logical mystery of a bad sort, or take the position that matter is a logical potentiality and take the consequences of having to admit the ontological status of nothingness.

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[11] Ibid., 1045 ^{b}28-1046 ^{a}20; David Ross, Aristotle (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1923), p. 176.

[12] Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Separate Substances, trans. Francis J. Lescoe (West Hartford, Connecticut: Saint Joseph College, 1959), pp. 55-56; F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books Inc., 1955), pp. 85-86.

The result of this discussion of Aristotle's metaphysic is that one may return to the conclusions reached in the analysis of Parmenides. Radical diversity and change can be granted a place in reality only in a metaphysic which has a non-rational character. Also, the admission of the term nothingness to the metaphysical structure near or at its foundation provides a metaphysic with that non-rational character. This having been established, the discussion must turn to the second major problem of this section. This problem is also pointed out by Parmenides when he makes the assertion that the concept of nothingness is inconceivable. It is certainly correct to say that in isolation a term such as nothingness is inconceivable. But this does not mean that in the context of a properly constructed metaphysical structure it cannot be conceivable. The problem which must be confronted, then, is that of determining how a metaphysical structure can be constructed so as to admit the term nothingness. One of the most successful attempts at such an operation is that of Hegel in his Science of Logic. A partial analysis of it will provide some answers to this problem.

For Hegel the concept of nothingness arises from logic's first term, pure being. Pure being is described as indeterminate immediacy. As such pure being is totally empty. But total emptiness is nothing. It follows from this, Hegel concludes, that pure being and nothingness are identical.[13] Thus has Hegel introduced the two terms required for the construction of a non-rationalistic metaphysic, a metaphysic in which richness is not illusory, but real. To extract oneself from the Hegelian logic at this point, however, is to be left with nothing but two terms with little if any advance from the position of Parmenides in providing for the reality of radical diversity and change.

To solve this difficulty Hegel makes use of his principle of dialectical reason. Accordingly, the reality of pure being and nothingness lies in neither concept, but in a third term, becoming. In becoming, pure being and nothingness are at the same time distinct and inseparable.[14] Becoming consists of two moments, arising and passing away.

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[13] G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1929, I, 94.

[14] *Ibid.*, I, 95.

Arising is the passing over from nothingness into being. Passing away is the passing over of pure being into nothingness.[15] In being and nothingness becoming finds its foundation, but it is in becoming that being and nothingness find their reality. Pure being and nothingness, however, do not achieve perfect unity in becoming. In becoming each exists only to disappear into the other. Becoming itself is self destructive.

Because this state of affairs surrounds becoming, Hegel concludes that it is necessary to introduce a fourth term, determinate being.[16] Determinate being is becoming transcended (aufgehoben). For Hegel, however, that which transcends does not leave behind that which is transcended. In transcendence the transcended is preserved and finished.[17] Therefore, in determinate being the moments of becoming, pure being and nothingness, are finished and preserved. In determinate being pure being and nothingness achieve a more perfect unity.[18] As with becoming, but this time in a more satisfactory way, determinate being finds its foundation in pure being and nothingness, while pure being and nothingness find their reality, a more substantial reality, in determinate being.

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[15] *Ibid.*, I, 118.

[16] *Ibid.*, I, 118-119.

[17] *Ibid.*, I, 119.

[18] *Ibid.*, I, 120.

It is not the intention of this essay to ground its argument completely in the Hegelian ontology. What must be appropriated is something akin to the dialectical reason, for it is because of this that Hegel is able to successfully introduce into his ontology nothingness and, through its introduction, to grant ontological status to radical diversity and change. Dialectical reason accomplished this end, for Hegel, because it is able to synthesize the more abstract and more incomplete terms into the more complete and concrete terms. This is accomplished through the law of negation. The law of negation overcomes the difficulty entailed in the principle of contradiction.[19] Contradiction permits a move from a term to its contradictory, but eliminates either term in the affirmation of the other. As Hegel uses the law of negation in his dialectical reason, one may move logically from one term to its negation in a way which preserves both terms in a condition of tension and lays the ground for the necessary introduction of a third and more complete term. This does not mean that Hegel is violating the law of non-contradiction. It simply means that dialectical reason as a process of reasoning goes beyond the law of identity. This was what was demonstrated in the analysis of pure being, nothingness and becoming presented above. Because he conceives reason to operate in such a way, Hegel is able to construct his ontology starting with the more incomplete and abstract terms and moving from them to the more complete and concrete. In so doing the terms nothingness and radical diversity and change can be granted ontological status.

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[19] Arthur Berndtson, "Hegel, Reason and Reality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XX (September, 1959), pp. 40-41.

Most other ontologies start with certain concepts which, although perhaps never found alone in reality, are conceived on the order of building blocks which are complete in themselves. Reality is literally constructed from these elements. Nothingness clearly cannot be conceived as an ontological term of this sort, and, therefore, would be inadmissable into these ontologies. Because these ontologies lack a place for nothingness, they must concede either to a homogeneous monism like that of Parmenides or to the admission of an element which is logically mysterious like that of Aristotle. Because of his method, Hegel avoids the pitfalls of these other ontologies.

But what justification can be given for the use of a dialectical reason or something analogous to it? Hegel's _Logic_ is a system of structured meanings. The ultimate justification for the inclusion of each term can be found in the final term, the Concept (_Begriff_). But the Concept is nothing more than a highly complex meaning. It remains to be determined, therefore, whether the Concept and all the terms which go into its logical derivation are truly terms of ontology. As Hegel sees it, the proof of the truth of the Concept is produced in his work _The Phenomenology of the Spirit_.[20] The _Phenomenology_ is the description of the Spirit's self-transcendence (_selbstaufheben_). There are two moments to the Spirit's self-transcendence: first its self-alienation and second its self-recovery in a sublimated form. The key to the activity of the Spirit is negation. It is in negation that the Spirit posits itself as the object, and it is in negating synthesis that it recovers itself. The negation as an activity of the Spirit parallels the law of negation which is central to the dialectic. The two are not identical, but the negation as an activity of the Spirit justifies the negation as the central law in dialectical reason.

Even without going into details of the _Phenomenology_, it is clear that, in order to account for such activities on the part of the Spirit, one must accept creativity as a necessary characteristic of Hegel's conception of Spirit. Only creativity as free activity can account for the profound negations which the Spirit undertakes in its self-alienation and self-recovery. It follows upon this that it is creativity which justifies the dialectical reason and the ontological terms which it actualizes.[21]

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[20] Hegel, _Op. Cit._, I, 60.

Certain generalizations can be made from this analysis of Hegel's philosophy. One may commence metaphysical speculation from a given determinateness, as is done in rationalistic metaphysics in their appeal to immutable essence. But the inescapable result of such an operation is a loss of richness in reality. In order for this richness to be maintained, radical diversity and radical change must be granted ontological status. In order to introduce these characters into an ontology it is necessary to introduce with a prior ontological status the term nothingness. But nothingness is an enigmatic term ontologically, because taken by itself it is inconceivable. Its ontological status is dependent, therefore, upon some principle of ontological structuring which is outside of the capacity of normal logic. Hegel's dialectical reason provides such a principle. But, as was demonstrated in the analysis of Hegel, this type of principle presupposes the reality of a particular type of ontological element. This element is creativity. The general conclusion which can be taken from the analysis of Hegel is that fundamental ontological status must be granted to creativity in order that nothingness and, as a consequence, radical diversity and change may find a place in ontology. It may also be determined from the analysis of Hegel how creativity and nothingness are ontologically related. Creativity does not bring about nothingness. As a result nothingness must be found outside creativity. But prior to the introduction of creativity nothingness remains epistemologically inconceivable and ontologically irrelevant. In Hegel the reality of a creative agent makes necessary the introduction of a law of reason which in turn makes necessary the inclusion of nothingness in the ontological structure. In general, then, it may be said that, because creativity in its free activity brings determinateness out of nothingness, creativity is ontologically prior to nothingness.

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[21] Berndtson, Op. Cit., pp. 43-44.

II. AXIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

In Section I of Chapter I it was asserted that it is in the realm of subjectivity that the being of value is to be found. In Section II of that chapter it was asserted that the being of value can be substantiated only in a non-rationalistic metaphysic. In Section I of this chapter an outline for a non-rationalistic metaphysic, including the terms creativity, being and nothingness was sketched. The task of the present section is to show how the non-rationalistic metaphysic can explain the being of value and, in particular, how the concept of nothingness is involved. The ontological context in which the being of value is to be found is primarily subjective, but its relation to objective reality is also important to its substantiation. Therefore, two issues must be considered: how the objective pole of reality may serve as the ground of value and how the subjective pole may serve as its source.

To discern how diversity and change present a ground for values, this discussion will focus on the structure of value taken as a whole. One discovers in examining the structures of value that the primary terms can be ordered as paired opposites. Moral goodness, for example, to be fully conceived must be opposed to moral badness. The same circumstance holds for justice and injustice and for beauty and ugliness. If the objective pole of reality does not contain radical diversity, that is, if diversity is relegated to the realm of illusion or reduced to a more fundamental homogeneity, then there is no ground in reality for the predication of these opposed values. If this is to be the case then value taken as a whole must either undergo a profound structural change or its being must be considered trivial and ludicrous. If these alternative conclusions are to be avoided, radical diversity must be granted a significant ontological status.

Change is also necessary in the objective pole of reality. There is a direction contained in the structure of value taken as a whole, a direction aimed away from the negative values towards the positive. If, using the same examples, moral badness, injustice and ugliness are predicable of entities with ontological status, change must be an aspect of reality. Change is necessary that moral goodness, justice and beauty might take the place of their opposites as applicable predicates. The element of direction in value is most strongly felt in the realm of moral values. Moral obligation arises from it. But even in the other realms of value there is at the minimum a hope for change. The change required cannot be illusory change, for that would entail the conclusion, for example, that the change of a situation judged to be unjust to one judged to be just would be illusory. Nor can it be a change reducible to necessary mechanistic or teleological law operating upon the base of immutable essences; for, if some objective entity were to possess an essence of which, for example, ugliness could be predicable, then such changes could not alter the being of that entity to provide the ground for the direction which is an aspect of value. In light of this analysis, one must conclude that, in order for value to find a ground in the objective pole of reality, radical change must have ontological status.

But, as was discovered earlier, radical diversity and change, if explainable in a synoptic metaphysic, presuppose the granting of ontological status to nothingness, which further presupposes ontological status for creativity. Hence, it can be finally concluded that if value, structured as above, is to have a ground for its predication of reality, nothingness and creativity must have ontological status.

The discussion now turns to the subjective pole of reality in an attempt to explain the being of value. It was demonstrated in Section I of Chapter I that value is not a quality of objects nor a disposition of objects to produce some particular effect in the subject, but a true creation of the subject. It will be necessary, then, to examine the subjective pole of reality for the source of value itself. It was demonstrated in Section II of Chapter I that the derivation of divine or human values could not be accounted for from the rationalistic ground of essences. It will be necessary, therefore, to appeal to those ontological terms which are prior to the being of essence, namely creativity and nothingness, to provide an explanation of the being of value.

As was demonstrated in Section I of the present chapter, creativity must be granted fundamental ontological status in order that radical diversity and change might in turn be granted ontological status. It has just been demonstrated how radical diversity and change, as products of creativity, make of the objective pole of reality a proper ground for value. Similarly, creativity acting in the subjective pole of reality can provide the source of value. As was asserted in Chapter I, the derivation of value cannot be reduced to a necessary formula for the modification of an underlying permanence bound by an immutable essence. It is clear that the being of value requires radical diversity and change in subjective being. It follows from this that, since the ontological status of radical diversity and change presuppose the reality of creativity, the being of value must be dependent upon creativity in the subjective domain. For the purposes of this essay any analysis of the process of creation of values at this point would be inappropriate, as it is to Sartre's metaphysic that this essay will critically turn for that analysis. It has been necessary here only to show how creativity is fundamental to any explanation of valuation.

It remains now only to determine the relationship between nothingness and value. As was true in the case of creativity and value, only an outline of this relationship need be given. However, because the move from the ontological level of creativity to that of being and nothingness is a move towards concrete reality, the relationship between nothingness and value is more determinate. Nothingness stands in relation to value in two distinct ways. In the first, nothingness must be conceived as that out of which values arise. Since it has been previously concluded that the generation of value cannot be explained in a deterministic formula, but that its generation is an essential mystery, it may now be concluded that this mystery of creation may be fitted to an explanation, only if it is conceived to arise from nothingness. The second way in which nothingness relates to value is as a threat to its being. Because life requires especially on the conscious level a structure of values, the fact that values do arise out of nothingness makes the direction of life completely contingent. The realization of this by the individual is what Paul Tillich calls ontological anxiety,[22] but has been variously described by all existentialist writers.

The conclusions reached in this section as a whole are hypothetical. One must take the position that an ontological structure must be found into which the mystery of the being of value can be fitted and that the subjective source and objective ground of value are realms of reality, not illusion. If these assumptions are accepted then the conclusions reached in this chapter can be accepted. It can be concluded that nothingness must be one of the fundamental terms in that ontology which gives an explanation of the genesis of value. Sartre does accept the assumptions upon which the conclusions here drawn are based. Hence, what has been demonstrated here can be used as a basis for a critical analysis of Sartre's position. The structuring of the terms creativity, being, nothingness and value produced here has been only a sketchy one. This essay will defer critically to Sartre's ontology to fill in what remains.

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[22] Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 32-40.

CHAPTER III

SARTRE: AN ONTOLOGY OF NIHILATION

In the two prior chapters the aim of the discussion was to expose an outline of an ontology which provides for the being of value. It was discovered that the being of value, at least of value as commonly experienced, placed certain requirements upon the objective pole of reality as its ground and upon the subjective pole as its source. It was further demonstrated that the ontological terms nothingness and creativity were necessary to the explanation of this reality. But what has been given has been only a bare outline of such an ontology. The examination of Sartre to be undertaken in the next three chapters will be an examination of one attempt to give a more determinate explanation to the being of value. The preceding, it is hoped, will provide a better understanding and ground for criticism of that attempt. In the present chapter a critical examination will be undertaken of the fundamentals of Sartre's metaphysic. In the following chapter Sartre's conception of the being of value will be similarly examined. In the final chapter a general evaluation of Sartre's project will be presented.

Before moving into an analysis of Sartre, there is one terminological difficulty which must be cleared up. From the beginning this essay has claimed to be a metaphysical discussion. Yet Sartre wants to have his phenomenological ontology thought of as pre-metaphysical. Metaphysical speculation, for Sartre, can concern itself only with hypotheses about being, for its objective is to explain the genesis of being. On the other hand he views his phenomenological ontology as illuminating the absolutely necessary conditions of the subject's relation to being.[1] Sartre's definition certainly applies to many metaphysical systems; and it is easy to see why a phenomenological ontology, with its emphasis upon individual consciousness, and an existentialism, with its emphasis on the solitude of man, would wish to be excluded from such a speculative realm. It is also easy to see that an existentialist, wishing to make solitude the necessary condition of man, would not wish to ground his analysis upon a hypothetical structure, for his reader would then be able to escape the consequent of solitude by denying the hypothesized antecedent. However, as significant as Sartre's distinction between phenomenological ontology and metaphysics is, it is not entirely true. In the first place Sartre's ontology itself contains several hypothetical postulates. It will be one of the objectives of this essay to show in what ways this is true. In the second place it is incorrect to say of metaphysical speculation that it is necessarily concerned with an examination of causes of being. It is appropriate, therefore, to take a broader view of metaphysical speculation which would encompass both of Sartre's terms. Whitehead defines metaphysics as the attempt to establish a structure which will provide an interpretation of every element of experience.[2] It is clear from this that Whitehead is not calling necessarily for an analysis of underlying causes. If, therefore, as has been done in this essay, one assumes Whitehead's definition as the definition of the metaphysical endeavour, then both phenomenological ontology and Sartre's conception of metaphysics could be included under the concept of metaphysics. To preserve Sartre's distinction, however, the term "genesis metaphysics" will be used to refer to his particular conception of metaphysics.

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[1] Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956), pp. 619-621.

In this chapter two issues will be dealt with. In the first section the object of discussion will be the foundations of Sartre's phenomenological ontology. In the second section the object will be nothingness, specifically how it is to be fitted into his ontology.

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[2] Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Harper & Bros., 1929), pp. 4-5.

I. PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

Even a casual survey of Sartre's literature and philosophy must lead one to the conclusion that his fundamental intellectual commitment is to the existential awareness. The theme of much of his literature is alienation, alienation of the individual from his world and, more importantly, alienation of the individual from his fellow. The existential awareness is an awareness of this alienation. In his philosophy this same theme is echoed in his well known proposition, "Existence precedes essence." Unlike some other thinkers who have tasted the existential awareness and have admitted its importance to the human situation, however, Sartre is further committed to establishing this awareness as the inescapable focus of the human situation. This fact does not simply serve as a genetic explanation of Sartre's philosophy. It provides this and more. It must be viewed as his bit of wisdom--or folly if one chooses--which guides this very eclectic philosopher through his complex philosophic system.

The above explanation of Sartre's intention will provide the touchstone for an understanding of the choice of phenomenological ontology as the realm for his inquiry. Starting with the assertion that existence precedes essence, it is easy to see why Sartre could not cast his lot with the absolute idealists. For the idealist, man can be only momentarily in solitude, his alienation being eventually overcome and his being subsumed under that of the absolute. It is essence which is most important to the idealist, for it forms a foundation for the subsumption of the individual under a complex greater than himself, granting a place to that individual. Sartre's commitment to the substantiation of the existential awareness makes it impossible for him to be an idealist.

This natural opposition of the existential awareness to idealism has led some commentators to the conclusion that Sartre is a realist. This conclusion is justified, if by it is meant only that Sartre is concerned with the concrete and particular.[3] However, while idealism grants constitutive powers to human or divine subjectivity, realism allows for none. For the realists things are as they seem, concrete and particular. What is of primary significance here is that they require of man only finite concerns and finite tasks. Sartre wishes to grant to realism its concern with the particular and concrete, but only because they are indicators of man's finitude. For him, although man is finite his tasks and concerns are infinite.

Naturalism will here refer to a plurality of metaphysical systems which are united by their use of hypothetical postulates, and their relegation of all metaphysical realities to the realm of nature. It has already been demonstrated that Sartre rejects genesis metaphysics because of their dependence upon hypotheses. At this point that criticism can be generalized. Because the impetus for Sartre's philosophy is a kind of awareness, he feels the need for a subjective ground for his metaphysic. A subjective ground, he thinks, will provide him with a metaphysic without postulates because the subjective condition is an absolute. The result, Sartre hopes, will be an ontology grounded upon epistemological certitude. The use of a subjective ground for ontology serves Sartre's purposes in another way. Subjectivity contains within it the principle for its separation from objectivity. This separation is exactly what Sartre is attempting to substantiate. Naturalism, because of its denial of a subjective basis for metaphysical analysis, therefore cannot be the metaphysical ground for which Sartre is looking.

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[3] Cf. Alfred Stern, Sartre (Second edition; New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), pp. 10-11.

All contemporary speculative philosophy which is concerned with phenomenology, be it metaphysical or epistemological, is indebted to the work of Husserl. It will be of no small aid, therefore, to examine briefly how Husserl provided the ground for Sartre's phenomenological ontology. It was Husserl's intent to make philosophy into an absolute science, at first for the sole purpose of providing an absolute ground to the elements of logic, but later for the enlarged purpose of providing such a ground for all contents of the mind. As he sees it, the biggest threat to this absolute science is what he calls psychologism. Psychologism attempts to account for logical elements, as well as other mental elements, through an objective psychological method. Mill's Logic is Husserl's paradigm of psychologism. To counter psychologism he appeals to a subjective method, a method which would allow an analysis of logical and perceptual constructs as they appear and would also allow for the revealing of subjective prejudices as such.[4] The affinity of Husserl's method with Sartre's project is clear. It allows him his subjective orientation, and it provides a basis for an attempt to substantiate with epistemological certainty the existential awareness.

The first move in the phenomenological method is the reduction. The reduction achieves for the operator a fundamental change in attitude. As Husserl sees it, man ordinarily carries with him in his interaction with the world a natural attitude. The natural attitude entails a concern for matters of fact and certain subjective prejudices. Both are envisioned as detrimental to a philosophy bent upon becoming an absolute science. The proper attitude for the operator of phenomenology entails the disengagement from concern with matters of fact and the objectification of otherwise subjective prejudices. There are two steps in Husserl's phenomenological reduction. The first is the eidetic reduction. In the eidetic reduction the essences and essential structures are abstracted from their involvement with particular facts. The second reduction is the transcendental reduction. The transcendental reduction, by bracketing all being, presents the operator with pure subjectivity.[5]

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[4] Marvin Farber, "Phenomenology," Twentieth Century Philosophy, Dagobert D. Runes, ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1943), pp. 349-353.

The eidetic reduction presents Sartre with the kind of objectivity appropriate to his concern. The phenomenal realm of essences and essential structure grants the possibility of a concrete and particular world without presupposing an ontological structure to objectivity. This fits Sartre's project, since any attempt to provide an ontological structure for objectivity which does not concern itself simultaneously with subjectivity is sure to reduce the significance of man's reaction to finding himself in objectivity. The transcendental reduction is most important to Sartre because it presents him with pure consciousness unencumbered with psychological and physiological determinates. Thus does the transcendental reduction present a good ground for the analysis and substantiation of the existential awareness.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354.

The most common term associated with phenomenology is intentionality. In phenomenology consciousness is defined as intentionality. In Husserl intentionality is the property of consciousness whereby it refers to something.[6] In Sartre it will have a slightly different definition, but Husserl's definition provides the genus of which Sartre's is a species. Two further terms add to the definition of intentionality. The _noema_ is the object-referent of consciousness. It is what is intended. It is not part of being, but simply what appears to consciousness. The _noesis_ is the cognitive activity, i.e., the act of intending itself.[7] For Sartre intentionality is the keystone of his phenomenological ontology.

But while Husserl's goal is an epistemological one, Sartre's is ontological. Husserl's aim is to gain a clear view of the structure and condition of mental contents, for purposes of constructing a theory of knowledge. From this same view of the structure and condition of mental contents, but with the addition of a proof of their ontological reference, Sartre's aim is to provide a picture of the human situation. The structure out of which Husserl is working can be seen as a subject-appearance relationship, but that from which Sartre is working must be viewed as a relationship between the being of the subject and the being of the object. The result of this, therefore, is that Sartre must go beyond Husserl to an ontology.

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[6] Herbert Spiegelberg, _The Phenomenological Movement_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), II, 719.

[7] _Ibid_., II, 721.

A number of commentators have criticised Sartre's use of the phenomenological method because of his concern with being.[8] Maurice Natanson, for example, charges that Sartre's concern with being is a denial of the method of reduction, which attempts to take the analysis of phenomena away from a concern with being. He also claims that Sartre's concern with being is a return to the natural attitude, which Husserl attempts to escape. Natanson's conclusion is that Sartre has only a quasi-phenomenological method which is more that of Hegel.[9] The conclusions to Natanson's argumentation are at least partly correct. Sartre is indebted to Hegel and it is true that Sartre does not restrict himself to Husserl's phenomenological method. Too, it is true that Sartre does not bind himself completely to descriptive phenomenology. Certain things, however, can be said in defense of Sartre's claim to the phenomenological method. First, although there are elements of a Hegelian-like dialectic, Sartre never allows his dialectic to transcend the tension between the being of the subject and the being of the object. Second, the claim that Sartre is untrue to the phenomenological reduction is false. Sartre never attempts to demonstrate his methodological principles, but it is clear that he did assume Husserl's reduction because he makes use of its results, the realm of essences taken in themselves as the object for subjectivity and, of course, the discovery that consciousness is intentionality. The fact that Sartre moves beyond descriptive phenomenology does not mean that he rejects the method by which it is achieved. Instead of interpreting Sartre's concern with ontology as a rejection of the phenomenological method of reduction, it seems more appropriate to say that he made use of it to establish the constitution of subjectivity and from this discovery, in a move paralleling that of Descartes, to construct an ontology. Finally, the objection that Sartre returns to the natural attitude is false, because Sartre maintains throughout his work that the assumption that there is an ordered material reality which defines all human concerns is a mistaken assumption.

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[8] Cf. Wilfrid Desan, _The Tragic Finale_ (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1954), pp. 133-134; Klaus Hartmann, _Sartre's Ontology_ (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 141-142; and Maurice Natanson, _A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's Ontology_ (Lincoln, Neb.,: University of Nebraska Press, 1951), pp. 70-71.

[9] Natanson, _op. cit._, pp. 67-74.

At this point it is clear why Sartre makes the move from epistemology to ontology. What must now be examined is how he actually makes this move. Descriptive phenomenology, Sartre thinks, has advanced philosophy by eliminating the metaphysical dualisms which had been implicit in it. The dualism of interior-exterior falls because phenomenology does not find in the exterior, the appearance, any implication of an interior. In a similar way do the dualisms of being-appearance, potency-act and appearance-essence dissolve. However, as Sartre sees it, one metaphysical dualism is implicit in descriptive phenomenology. This is the dualism of finite-infinite. What is experienced is a finite number of appearances for any single object. Any metaphysical speculation about these appearances reveals that, because the subject is always changing, it must be assumed that there are an infinite number of possible appearances.[10] In pointing out this new dualism Sartre is setting up the foundation for an ontological inquiry. This does not entail a rejection of the phenomenological method, for what Sartre is concerned with here are metaphysical implications of the discoveries of descriptive phenomenology. Sartre has set himself up to ask the question about the being of the knower and the being of the known.

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[10] Sartre, op. cit., pp. xlv-xlviii.

First, the being of the knower must be substantiated. To accomplish this Sartre makes use of the phenomenological conception of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be reduced to the known, but must be accounted for in the relationship between the knower and the known, i.e., the noesis and the noema. Descriptive phenomenology thus lends to Sartre's argument for the involvement of the knower, but Sartre's intentions are ontological and, as a result, he finds it necessary to substitute the being of the knower. Knowledge, he argues, requires the support of solid being or it falls into nothingness. In order for knowledge to be supported by being, it must be assumed that the knower has being. However, it is obvious that the being of the knower cannot be phenomenal being, for that would entail the previously rejected assertion that knowledge contains its own being. Hence, Sartre concludes, the being of the knower must be a transphenomenal being.[11]

Having substantiated the transphenomenal being of the knower, Sartre's next task is to characterize it; again he leans heavily upon phenomenology. The knowing being is consciousness. Consciousness does not contain the known as was asserted by Descartes and Hume, but rather it intends it.[12]

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[11] Ibid., pp. l-li. [12] Ibid., pp. li-lii.

There are, for Sartre, two forms of consciousness, the pre-reflective consciousness and the reflective consciousness. The pre-reflective consciousness is intentionality directed towards the world, that is, it is not directly conscious of itself as an object. However, the pre-reflective consciousness contains a relationship to itself, the relationship arising out of its non-positional awareness of itself which is a part of any cognitive activity. A non-positional awareness is an awareness of existence but not essence. Pre-reflective consciousness, therefore, contains an awareness of its own existence.[13] It is essential to Sartre's ontology that this relation of pre-reflective consciousness to itself be substantiated. Consequently, Sartre argues that an act of consciousness of something which was not aware of itself as such would be an ignorant and unconscious consciousness, which, of course, is impossible.[14] With this somewhat problematic argument Sartre establishes the structure of the being-for-itself, the being of consciousness whose existence precedes its essence.

Reflective consciousness, for Sartre, does not differ structurally from pre-reflective consciousness. Their difference lies in their respective objects. The object of the pre-reflective consciousness is the world, that of the reflective consciousness pre-reflective consciousness.[15] According to Sartre, reflective consciousness does not have autonomy from the pre-reflective consciousness, but neither is it identical with it. It is, therefore, a consciousness of itself as not being itself. This strange relationship occurs because reflection is an attempt by consciousness to escape its structure, an attempt which, nevertheless, fails by virtue of the fact that reflection is aware of itself as reflecting and the pre-reflective consciousness is aware of itself as being reflected upon.[16] There are two modes of reflection for Sartre, pure and impure. The object of pure reflection is consciousness itself, that is, being-for-itself. The object of impure reflection is the ego. The ego is a transcendent object of consciousness which impure reflection in accord with its natural attitude--called by Sartre, bad faith--hypothesizes as the center of consciousness' states, qualities and actions.[17]

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[13] Ibid., pp. lii-liv. [14] Ibid., p. li.

The second and most difficult task in Sartre's move from descriptive phenomenology to ontology is the substantiation of the being of the object. His problem closely parallels that which Descartes had in his Meditations. Sartre's first step is to separate the phenomenon of being from the being of the phenomenon. The phenomenon of being is that which the subject encounters in boredom and nausea. It is part of the structure of appearance. However, because on the ontological level any appearance requires the being of phenomenon as a necessary condition for its revelation, the being of phenomenon cannot be found in any particular appearance. Like the being of the knower, the being of the known, the phenomenon, must be a transphenomenal being.[18]

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., pp. 151-152

[17] Ibid., pp. 160-165.

The second step in Sartre's substantiation of the being of the object is that of proving that consciousness is not sufficient to provide the transphenomenal foundation for appearance. To accomplish this Sartre proposes two lines of argument. The first of these is founded upon the passivity of appearances. It is clear, Sartre thinks, that the appearance is passive, but even passivity must have being at its foundation. If it did not then the term passivity, Sartre argues, would be meaningless. The passive-active relationship, Sartre claims, contains the basis for the assertion that appearance is founded in a distinct being. The passivity of the recipient demands an equal passivity on the part of the agent but, since consciousness as pure spontaneity contains no passivity, it is impossible for appearance to receive its being from consciousness.[19]

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[18] _Ibid_., pp. xlviii-l. [19] _Ibid_., pp. lviii-lix.

Sartre's second line of argument, the ontological proof, is more important. The argument starts from the intentionality of consciousness. Consciousness must intend something. According to Sartre, consciousness must either create its object or stand in an intentional relation to it as a transcendent being. Now if consciousness constitutes the being of its object, then distinct from consciousness the object is nothing. But the very nature of consciousness demands that it intend something and not nothing. Hence, the thesis that consciousness creates its object is absurd and, therefore, Sartre claims, one must accept the conclusion that there is a separate transphenomenal being at the foundation of the phenomenon, being-in-itself. The ontological argument does more for Sartre's ontology than prove the existence of being-in-itself. While the structure of being-for-itself proved to be such that its existence preceded and posited its essence, the ontological argument proves that the basic structure of being-in-itself is such that its essence posits its existence.[20] In this way Sartre establishes the essential duality out of which the rest of his ontology flows.

But more can be said of the structure of being-in-itself. Being-in-itself, for Sartre, cannot be a created being nor can it create itself. It cannot be created by God, for the nature of consciousness, human or divine, is such that, if the being-in-itself were situated in it, it could never escape. For being-in-itself to be self-creating it would have to be active. But the terms active and passive only take on a meaning with the involvement of human consciousness.[21] The being-in-itself can be derived neither from possibility nor from necessity. The being-in-itself is not necessary because necessity requires some prior being. It is not derived from possibility since possibility is introduced by being-for-itself. Being-in-itself must be, therefore, a contingent being.[22]

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[20] *Ibid.*, pp. lx-lxii.

In that part of Sartre's speculation so far exposed one finds a masterfully laid foundation for the task of substantiating the existential awareness. However, Sartre seems to view his efforts not simply as a proposed ontological foundation, but a foundation grounded in epistemological certitude. Ever since Descartes proposed the possibility of an evil genius and tried to prove that his metaphysical speculation was true in spite of that possibility, a significant number of philosophers have attempted to parallel this task in grounding their own metaphysical speculation. The purpose behind this is to lend credence to their metaphysic from their epistemological analysis. Two of the most common metaphysical positions, realism and idealism, can be distinguished and defined according to the epistemological principles used to prove that their respective assertions about reality are true. The ideal of such procedures is to ground metaphysics upon epistemological certainties. Another approach to metaphysics, exemplified by naturalism, is to start from admittedly metaphysical postulates in creating a metaphysical structure, leaving verification of the structure to a separate analysis of the efficacy of the explanations which can be deduced from it. It is the general thesis of this essay that no metaphysic can be constructed without some strictly metaphysical postulates at its foundation. Specifically, the intention of this essay will be to demonstrate what must be taken to be a postulate in Sartre's ontological foundation.

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[21] Ibid., pp. lxiv-lxv. [22] Ibid., pp. lxvi-lxvii.

The intentionality of consciousness is the basic epistemological principle upon which Sartre grounds the argument in which he builds his ontological foundation. There are only two ways in which one can arrive at the proposition that consciousness is intentionality. It may be discovered empirically, applying the term empirical in its broadest meaning, and it may be the result of definition. If it is discovered empirically it is dependent for its factual status upon its being discovered by other subjects.

But in order for other subjects to discover it, it is necessary that certain postulates must first be accepted as to what empirical data is relevant. Husserl is doing this when he institutes his phenomenological reduction. The assertion that consciousness is intentionality may be a postulated definition. This does not make intentionality something trivial, for such a definition may be useful in explaining subjectivity and its relation to experience. However, intentionality as a definition of consciousness would clearly rank as an assumption.

Sartre's ontological proof is an attempt to move from an epistemological circumstance to an assertion about the reality beyond subjectivity. From what has just been said about intentionality it is clear that this ontological proof carries no absolute certainty. But beyond this, a careful examination of the argument will reveal that it is making another postulate concerning consciousness, a claim which is not epistemological, as was the claim about consciousness' intentionality, but metaphysical. In order for Sartre's proof to be valid, one must assume that consciousness intends something beyond appearance. To deny that this assumption is made entails the conclusion that the argument is invalid. Sartre is attempting to prove that consciousness cannot provide the being of its object because that would require consciousness to intend an element without being. This Sartre claims is absurd because consciousness must always intend something. But this does not prove that consciousness has an ontological intent. Sartre is left open, therefore, to the charge that he is merely playing with the words "something" and "nothing," for it is still possible that consciousness intends an appearance divorced from being.[23] One must, therefore, take it as one of Sartre's metaphysical assumptions that intentionality is directed towards being.

A similar situation surrounds Sartre's proof that consciousness, even on the pre-reflective level, is non-positionally aware of its own existence. Sartre attempts to prove that it is by claiming that to assert otherwise would be to assert that consciousness were not aware of itself as consciousness and would be, as a result, a consciousness which was ignorant and unconscious. Such a proof is fallacious because, even if consciousness were unaware of itself, but were still aware of some object, it could not, on balance, be said to be ignorant. Sartre must establish pre-reflective consciousness' non-positional awareness of itself in a postulate. Further, even granting Sartre's claim that knowledge requires the substantiation of being, it cannot be deductively shown that consciousness as the knower possesses a separate existence. One could just as easily make the claim that the ontological status of consciousness is dependent totally upon the being of the phenomenon. The assertion that there is a separate being-for-itself, then, also must be a postulate.

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[23] Robert E. Butts, "Does 'Intentionality' Imply 'Being'?" Kant-Studien, LII (1960-1961), 430-431.

What this essay has attempted to establish is not that Sartre has made an error in the construction of the foundation of his ontology. On the contrary, it is one well suited to his purposes. Further, there has been no attempt made to cut Sartre out from the ranks of phenomenologists, for even an epistemological doctrine such as phenomenology fails to accomplish the science without hypotheses as Husserl had hoped it would. What has been established is that Sartre's metaphysical foundations, as are all such, contain certain postulates and, therefore, that his phenomenological ontology can and must be judged upon the explanations which it gives to reality.

II. THE ORIGIN OF NOTHINGNESS

With Sartre's basic ontology exposed it is now possible to discover the mechanisms by which he introduces nothingness and the nihilating activity into that ontology. The preceding discussion of the structure of being-in-itself and being-for-itself clearly indicates that the burden of nothingness and the genesis of nihilation belong to being-for-itself. Because the essence of being-in-itself posits its existence, it must be conceived as pure plenitude and not the source of nothingness nor the nihilating agent. The structure of nothingness and nihilation must lie with being-for-itself. The objective of the present discussion will be to show how Sartre demonstrates this.

The first step in Sartre's argument is an examination of the structure of the _negatités_. A _negatité_ is a not-being found in the world taken as the human situation. To explicate their nature Sartre examines three circumstances in which they appear, interrogation, the negative judgment and destruction. For purposes of this essay it will suffice to examine only interrogation. When one asks a question he places an expectation upon the world and in so doing uncovers three not-beings: the not-being of knowledge in the subject, the not-being of the possible negative answer and the not-being which truth brings. The not-being which truth establishes occurs because the answer to the question, in the form X is Y, eliminates the possibility that X is Z, making Z a not-being.[24]

The question is: Where are these _negatités_ to be located? They cannot be found in being-in-itself, for, as has been explained earlier, being-in-itself is beyond affirmation and negation. But neither are the negatités the result of subjective judgment. To assert this is to assume that negatités depend upon some positive fact about reality and, as a result, have only a psychic existence. For Sartre, negatités occur in the world, but only in the world taken as the human situation. They require human involvement, but their existence is not totally subjective.[25]

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[24] Sartre, _op_. _cit_. pp. 4-6.

Sartre's conclusions about the negatités presuppose that they are not relative not-beings, but absolute not-beings. If they were relative they would be dependent upon something positive and could be reduced to the status of subjective judgment or a category of objective being. This assumption on Sartre's part fits in with his further analysis of the structure of being-for-itself, but it is precisely because he sees the negatités as pools of absolute, not-being that he can assert what he does about being-for-itself. However, if the analysis given in Chapter II of this essay is correct and relative not-being implies absolute not-being, then his assumption is a safe one.

Sartre's next problem is to determine what structures must be in reality in order that the negatités might be found in the world of the human situation. It is assumed by Sartre that the negatités, as pools of not-being, require that ontological status be given to the general term nothingness. There is no difficulty in accepting this assumption, since the *negatités* are already admitted to be absolute not-beings. Sartre's problem becomes, then, to find the ontological structure which allows for nothingness. For Sartre there must be a being by which nothingness comes about. First, such a being must have the capacity to nihilate itself. Second, it must be able to sustain nothingness. Third, it must be able to bring nothingness to objects and, fourth, it cannot be either passive or indifferent to nothingness. As Sartre sees it, this can be accomplished by a being whose own being is in question.[26] As will be demonstrated shortly, this being is being-for-itself.

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[25] Ibid., pp. 6-8.

The same ontological complex which supports nothingness, Sartre claims, also supports freedom and anguish. The imposition of *negatités* upon the world of the human situation requires an inventive being. A truly inventive being cannot be conceived to be causally bound to the past by motivation and must, therefore, be considered free. But this is not sufficient to define the freedom of this being. Freedom runs deeper in such a being because of the particular type pf product of its inventiveness. As stated above, in order for a being to be able to impose a *negatité* upon the world it must have its own being left in question. Hence, it is the most profound of all possible species of freedom which defines the condition of such a being.[27] The same factors which actualize nothingness and radical freedom actualize anguish. A being cut off from the motivational determination from the past is clearly in anguish when facing the future. But anguish too is more profound than this in Sartre's system. That being which actualizes nothingness and, at the same time, freedom does so because its own being is in question. This profound form of self-questioning contains within it upon reflection the profoundest form of anguish.[28]

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[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

As was stated above, for Sartre the being which supports nothingness is being-for-itself, the being of consciousness. Consciousness, defined as intentionality, intends being-in-itself, the being of phenomenon. But, for Sartre, its intentionality is grounded in the ontologically prior context of a non-positional awareness of itself. The non-positional awareness is an awareness only of existence. As Sartre sees it, because being-for-itself is aware only of its own existence, its being must be said to be in question. In this way the ontological status of nothingness, as well as freedom and anguish, are actualized. But to fully under-stand the progression from non-positional consciousness to the self-questioning being and from there to nothingness and the circumstances resulting from it, a closer look must be taken at being-for-itself.

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[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28. [28] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-33.

Being-for-itself's presence to itself is, for Sartre, the fundamental structure of its non-positional awareness of itself. As he sees it, consciousness' non-positional awareness of itself is an awareness of its existence detached from any essence. He also believes that the being of consciousness is in question. The second statement follows from the first and an analysis of consciousness' presence to itself will demonstrate how. The phrase "presence to self" implies a detachment upon the part of consciousness. The detachment results because being-for-itself is both the being which is non-positionally aware and the being of which it is non-positionally aware. This detachment in turn implies a fissure in the being of consciousness. It is this fissure which makes consciousness question its own being.[29] This explanation of the circumstances of being-for-itself provides the ground for understanding the origin of nothingness. The first requirement Sartre placed upon that being which generates nothingness is that it must have the capacity to nihilate itself. The fissure created in being-for-itself's presence to itself is the act of self-nihilation. The fourth requirement of that being which generates nothingness is that it not be indifferent to nothingness. The presence of being-for-itself to itself guarantees this.

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[29] Ibid., pp. 77-79.

But being-for-itself's presence to itself is threatened by any allegation that introspection provides a content containing an essence. If, for example, one could find in introspection a being with the essential character of belief, the being of the self could overcome the fissure which Sartre describes. For Sartre the discovery of such a being is possible, but only by the reflective consciousness. But as he sees it, the reflective consciousness is a secondary form of consciousness. The pre-reflective consciousness, the primary mode of consciousness, is never conscious of itself as an object. To assert that it could would be to distort the meaning of intentionality. Belief is the condition of pre-reflective consciousness, never its content. For Sartre, therefore, it is impossible to mend the fissure in consciousness through reflection.[30]

Sartre uses the term facticity to refer to a second structure of being-for-itself's non-positional awareness of itself, its connection with being-in-itself. Being-for-itself always finds itself in a condition. The condition, for Sartre, is not the same thing as the situation. The situation is the object of consciousness' intentionality. The condition is the set of contingent circumstances which immediately surround the existent consciousness. The condition is revealed to a particular consciousness in the act of reflection, but it indicates, nevertheless, that there is some circumstance surrounding pre-reflective consciousness itself, for consciousness must be conceived as founding its own being, and, hence, not itself a contingent being. Contingency is the circumstance of being-in-itself. Sartre resolves this difficulty by showing that being-for-itself is continually founding itself through the process of nihilating being-in-itself. But even this act of nihilation presupposes an original relationship between being-for-itself and being-in-itself. This relationship is facticity.[31] The second requirement Sartre places upon that being, by which nothingness gains ontological status, is that it be able to sustain nothingness. The presence to itself of consciousness provides the ground for the original nihilation, but it does not guarantee that this nihilation is not a singular act. The fact that being-for-itself stands in the relationship of facticity to being-in-itself makes it clear why being-for-itself must continually undertake the nihilating project and in so doing sustain nothingness. Facticity, in short, guarantees the constant presence of nothingness.

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[30] Ibid., pp. 75-76.

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[31] Ibid., pp. 79-84.

Sartre's third requirement of that being which generates nothingness is that it be able to bring nothingness to objects. This is achieved by consciousness because of the fact that its intentionality is directed towards reality. But intentionality in Husserl's conception of it does not carry nothingness with it. The additional structure which Sartre would impose on the intentionality of consciousness is transcendence. Transcendence is conditioned by consciousness' presence to itself and its facticity. In its presence to itself is contained the fissure in the being of consciousness and in its facticity is contained the original relationship between it and being-in-itself. The consequence of these two structures is that intentionality is not simply a directedness towards its object in appearance as Husserl conceived it, but a transcendence of itself in its original relation to the being of that appearance, being-in-itself. This transcendence has a constituting effect upon the world. It is this transcendence which places the negatités in the world. Although it does impose nothingness upon the world, the primary project of being-for-itself in transcendence is to provide a foundation for itself, that is, an attempt to find an essence for the existent consciousness.[32] Sartre finds two structures involved in the project of transcendence. The two structures of transcendence are self-value and possibility. Self-value would present the existent consciousness with an essence and possibility would provide the ground for the actualization of the prescriptive aspects of that essence. As Sartre views them, these structures, self-value and possibility, are not distinct from being-for-itself's presence to itself and facticity as one might think, rather they are derived from them.

Self-value and possibility arise out of the circumstance by which the being of being-for-itself comes under question. Because facticity and presence to itself cause it to nihilate itself as being-in-itself, it finds in itself a lack when compared with being-in-itself. There are three terms to this lack, that which is lacked, that which lacks and the totality broken by the lack. For Sartre desire proves the reality of this lack. Desire cannot be accounted for in a conatus, for a conatus can only set up a state in the subject and cannot direct that state towards an object. What is required, therefore, is a being which contains a lack as part of its structure, which transcends towards the object of desire.[33]

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[32] Ibid., pp. 172-180. [33] Ibid., pp. 87-88.

The lacked is self-value. In structuring it this way Sartre makes self-value part of the structure of being-for-itself. However, because it is taken by being-for-itself in its fundamental lacking, self-value is something which can never be actualized. If actualized it would provide being-for-itself with the essence which its existence is missing and would fill the fissure in its being. But this would destroy being-for-itself and is, therefore, impossible. Thus, the possibility of self-value haunts being-for-itself in its transcendence.[34] Self-value as Sartre is using it here is not the value the being of which is being sought here. To use another phrase, it is the possible meaning for being-for-itself taken as a self. However, it will prove to be one of the more important structures determining the being of value taken in the sense in which it is here being sought.

Possibility arises, for Sartre, out of the same lack as does self-value. It cannot be an element of objective being as it is in Aristotle's theory of potentiality, for being-in-itself is pure plenitude. But, on the other hand, it cannot have a purely subjective existence as it does, for example, in Leibniz' conception of God. Possibility, for Sartre, comes into being in the relationship between subject and object. Possibility owes its existence to that original act whereby being-for-itself nihilates being-in-itself. Possibility is the mode of the lack in being-for-itself in which it intends by transcendence being-in-itself. Through its transcendence, therefore, being-for-itself puts possibility into the world taken as the human situation.[35]

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[34] Ibid., pp. 85-87.

The way in which Sartre has structured being-for-itself must lead one to the conclusion that he means to give it the status of a creative agent. In its transcendence being-for-itself creates the world as a human situation. It should be noted, however, that its creativity is limited to the realm of essences, since the existences of reality's beings are already fixed. The circumstances of the existence of being-for-itself are fixed by its facticity. The existence of being-in-itself, as was established by Sartre's ontological proof, is fixed by that essence which determines the flow of appearances as such. The creative activity of being-for-itself, then, is limited to the attempt to add, to the structure of essences of simple appearance, the additional essences necessary for making the being of appearance into a human situation. This is accomplished through being-for-itself's attempt to find an essence for its own existence.

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[35] Ibid., pp. 95-102.

In its transcendence being-for-itself brings _ekstases_ into being. An _ekstasis_ is a gap between being-for-itself and other elements of reality. They come into being in the light of being-for-itself's transcendence, but their effect is to insure the failure of the goal of transcendence, self-foundation. The first _ekstasis_ is temporality; this is the gap which exists between past and future. The second _ekstasis_ is the reflective _ekstasis_; this is the gap in reflection between consciousness as reflecting and consciousness as reflected. The third _ekstasis_ is the _ekstasis_ of being for others; here the gap exists between the self and the other (another self). The _ekstases_ have a special significance to the project in the transcendence of being-for-itself of founding itself, for they guarantee its failure. According to Sartre, if the negative relationship which exists between being-for-itself and being-in-itself and which is internal to being-for-itself could be founded upon a negative relationship which is contained in a separate being, e. g., the mind of God, and is external to being-for-itself, then being-for-itself would be included in a totality.[36] The result would be that it would be provided with a foundation, for it would, through its inclusion in a totality, have an essence. The _ekstases_ are put into reality by virtue of the self-nihilation of being-for-itself and make impossible any such totality.

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[36] _Ibid_., pp. 230-232, 298.

Temporality is the ekstasis immediately resulting from the original nihilation by being-for-itself of being-in-itself. For Sartre there are two aspects to time, static temporality and dynamic temporality. Static temporality encompasses the relationships of before and after. The existence of static temporality, Sartre claims, depends upon three dimensions of being-for-itself. One dimension of being-for-itself is its being in its original relation to being-in-itself, its facticity. In the nihilation of that dimension, which is the natural outcome of the structure of being-for-itself, pastness is created. A second dimension of being-for-itself is its lack. The not-yet is what is lacked. Therefore, through the lack as a dimension of being-for-itself the future as the not-yet is created. A third dimension of being-for-itself is its presence to itself. In its presence to itself consciousness finds itself at the same time nowhere and everywhere. As such being-for-itself is in flight. This flight is the present.[37] But time is not only a relationship between past, present and future, but also something which proceeds. Succession in time is dynamic temporality. It has already been shown why temporality, for Sartre, must be a function of being-for-itself. As a result, there should be no difficulty in accepting Sartre's assertion that the problem of dynamic temporality is to determine why being-for-itself must undergo modification and why it must make past what is now present.[38] Sartre's answer is that dynamic temporality is the result of the attempt to fill the fissure which exists in being-for-itself's presence to itself. Succession is accounted for by the fact that the fissure is a necessary structure in being-for-itself and, hence, can never be filled.[39]

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[37] Ibid., pp. 137-142.

In most philosophic systems the importance of temporality is that it is a dimension of the real or of thought about the real. For Sartre temporality is a dimension of the world taken as the human situation, but, more importantly, it is the mode of being-for-itself's relationship to being-in-itself. As such it guarantees the failure of the project of self-foundation. If consciousness could fill the fissure in its being with what is not yet, then it could make a totality of itself. The reality of the past, present, and future make this impossible. Thus is temporality the first _ekstasis_ in reality.

Sartre's conception of the reflective consciousness has been explained in the first section of this chapter. At this point, however, it is well to raise the question as to why being-for-itself undertakes reflection. Sartre claims that reflection is an attempt on the part of being-for-itself to gain a positive relationship with being-in-itself. When being-for-itself as a pre-reflective consciousness is reflected upon, it undergoes a profound modification. It loses its autonomy. Reflection appears, therefore, to contain the potentiality for providing a foundation to being-for-itself. It appears that reflection might be able to place it into totality. In Sartre's system, however, the reflective project is doomed to failure because the reflecting consciousness is a being-for-itself immanent with that reflected upon. Reflection is simply the knowledge on the part of the original being-for-itself of what it has to be. As such the reflective consciousness is coextensive with the pre-reflective consciousness and, therefore, must have a temporality of its own to encompass that of pre-reflective consciousness. Its past is its own since it is dependent upon memory and subject to its contingencies. Its future is its own possibility, not that of pre-reflective consciousness. The result is that it contains its own principle of flight and must fail in its task of placing being-for-itself into a totality. For Sartre, then, this is the ekstasis of reflection.[40]

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[38] _Ibid_., p. 142. [39] _Ibid_., pp. 146-149.

An understanding of the ekstasis which Sartre discovers between the self and the other requires an understanding of how Sartre solves the problem of solipsism. One first encounters the other as object. This encounter is not substantially different from an encounter with any object. One does perceive in the other taken as an object, however, a center of reference to the world. The result of this is that the world as centered around the self appears to be in flight towards the other. This situation sets up the possibility of the self's becoming an object for the other. This possibility cannot be actualized until the self encounters the look. The look is the self's discovery that it is an object of a consciousness. It is not a necessary or sufficient condition that the look result from the appearance of the other with its eyes fixed upon the self, for such an appearance could be, as easily as any other, an object for the self. Any number of circumstances provide the occasion for the feeling of the look. The look penetrates the self and makes an object of it. In the look the self becomes an object for the other.[41] For Sartre, the above analysis solves the problem of solipsism, for through it the existence of the other, at least to his own satisfaction, has been proven. However, the same analysis sets up the reciprocal relation between the self and the other out of which is born the third ekstasis of reality.

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[40] Ibid., pp. 150-158. [41] Ibid., pp. 252-253.

In Sartre's analysis the being of the other as an object presents itself as a totality. If through the look the self as object could be incorporated into that totality, then the being of being-for-itself as that self would be provided with a foundation. But for Sartre this is not to be. In order for the other to be an object and, hence, a totality, the self as being-for-itself must attend it in the mode of transcendence. This transcendence is made possible by the original fissure which exists in the being of being-for-itself. The fissure in the being of consciousness is a necessary condition of the being of the other as object. On the other hand, the self is the object for the other only when the latter transcends the self's transcendence. Under these circumstances the being of the other is not presented as a totality. The circumstances following upon this reciprocal relationship create the consequence that the being of the other cannot provide the totality necessary to found the being of the self. In this analysis, then, Sartre has uncovered a third ekstasis in reality.[42]

Two problems present themselves for discussion. The first concerns Sartre's conception of facticity. For Sartre, facticity is the original relationship between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. It is the relationship between consciousness and the contingent circumstances in which it finds itself, a relationship, that is, between being-in-itself and the pure existent of which consciousness is non-positionally aware. Facticity serves the function in Sartre's ontology of saving it from monadism. Although its function is clear, it is not clear how facticity comes to be a structure of being-for-itself. It clearly cannot be the result of consciousness' intentional acts, because for Sartre intentionality as transcendence has a constituting effect upon being-in-itself. Facticity is a part of the structure which determines the nature of that constituting and, therefore, must be conceived to be ontologically prior to intentionality. It is also true that, unlike being-for-itself's presence to itself, its facticity cannot be deduced from the previously postulated existence and non-positional awareness of itself of being-for-itself, for there is no implicit negation of monadism contained in these postulates. One must conclude, therefore, that in Sartre's system facticity is another postulate about the structure of being-for-itself.

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[42] Ibid., pp. 299-303.

The second problem concerns the creative agency of being-for-itself. In the analysis of the last chapter it was demonstrated that creativity was necessary to support the ontological structures of nothingness and whatever arises out of nothingness. To perform this function creativity must have both a negative and a positive aspect. The negative aspect of creativity is its freedom from determination, which is at the same time its brotherhood with nothingness. But creativity cannot be defined in terms of its negative aspect alone. It must have a positive aspect. It is by virtue of creativity's positive aspect that it brings something into being out of nothingness. Nothingness alone cannot provide the basis for the explanation of the ontological status of anything outside of itself. Sartre's explanation of the structure of being-for-itself involves only the negative aspect of creativity. Being-for-itself is a being which possesses existence without essence. With respect to the realm of essence being-for-itself is nothingness. Clearly being-for-itself contains the negative aspect of creativity. But this is as much as Sartre is willing to ascribe to being-for-itself, and yet his ontology clearly requires the positive aspect of creativity.

The examples of temporality and transcendence will exemplify Sartre's difficulty. It is clear how the nihilating activity of Sartre's creative agent creates pastness and the present. In being-for-itself's presence to itself and facticity, the present as the resulting flight and the past as that from which being-for-itself flees are created. But the future is constituted by the structures of promised self-value and possibility. Sartre claims that self-value and possibility can be constituted from the lack found in being-for-itself's presence to itself. But self-value and possibility cannot be fully constituted by the lack, for, even if they exist only as the promise of the future, they still must be the result of a positive aspect in creativity, even if it is no more than an act of imagination.

The same thing can be demonstrated in transcendence. For Sartre transcendence is fundamentally the fleeing of being-for-itself from itself. It is clear that it is actualized in being-for-itself's presence to itself. But, as Sartre sees it, transcendence is also the project of self-foundation and, as such, it is the mechanism for constituting the world as a human situation with the goal of providing being-for-itself with a totality in which it can find its own foundation. Here again, one finds that Sartre is attempting to reduce the positive aspect of creativity to the negative. But the project of self-foundation again requires at the minimum the positive aspect of creativity of imagination to propose the goal of self-foundation.

In Sartre's ontology the reduction of the positive aspect of creativity to the negative has the result of making the project of self-foundation unachievable and of making impossible the actualization of the promise of the future. Sartre's intention to substantiate the existential awareness as the reality of the human situation is aided as a consequence. But these circumstances do not mitigate the fact that Sartre is demanding too much of the negative aspect of creativity.

CHAPTER IV

SARTRE: THEORY OF VALUATION

It has been established that value cannot be defined in terms of some characteristic of objectivity or in terms of some effect which a particular element in objectivity has upon subjectivity. Objectivity is related to the being of value as its ground and as such it must contain certain structures in order for value to be more than a subjective illusion. But the source of value, it has been shown, is subjectivity. The being of any particular value and the being of value itself arise in an act of creativity on the part of subjectivity in a free response to objectivity.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine a more specific aspect of Sartre's ontology to determine how he accounts for the being of value. Sartre has chosen to assert the ontological primacy of human being. It clearly follows upon this that for him the being of value is to be found in the contexts which define human reality. The objectivity which functions as the ground for the being of value, therefore, must be the world taken as the human situation. The first section of this chapter will consider such a world. On the other hand, the subjectivity which functions as the source of valuation and which, as a consequence, provides the bulk of that context in which is to be found the being of value must be human subjectivity. The second section of this chapter will consider this subjectivity with respect to its generation of value.

One thing must be kept in mind as the analysis of Sartre's theory of valuation proceeds, namely that Sartre's primary intention is to substantiate the existential awareness. For him this means that human solitude cannot be overcome. A value provides the human subjectivity with an immediate relationship with some element in objectivity, whether being-in-itself or other. It is immediate because it does not require that there be an external dimensional continuum upon which it is measured, as is the case, for example, with spatial and temporal relationships. It is this fact, actually, which leads to the conclusion that values cannot be reduced to the status of a characteristic of objects. But what is of importance here is that this immediate relationship which a value introduces between subjectivity and objectivity is a basis of communication which, if fully actualized, would overcome the solitude of man. As a result, Sartre's commitment to the necessity of human solitude entails a further commitment to the proposition that the project of human valuation contains a principle guaranteeing its failure. This does not mean that values do not have a being in Sartre's ontology, but rather that their being is not sufficient to take man out of the condition of solitude. It will be necessary to keep in mind, therefore, that, at the same time that Sartre is providing the context for the being of value, he is insuring that the purpose for which they are brought into being will not be fulfilled.

I. GROUND OF VALUATION

In Chapter II it was demonstrated that the radical diversity and change presented in common experience must be granted ontological status in the objective pole of reality in order that this objectivity might function as the ground for values. What must be examined here are the conditions under which Sartre grants them ontological status.

If the arguments presented in Chapter II are correct, then radical diversity and change could not arise from being-in-itself from itself. In that chapter it was demonstrated that the granting of ontological status to radical diversity and change requires that prior ontological status be granted to nothingness as it is found in juxtaposition with creativity. Being-in-itself is beyond the nihilating act by which nothingness gains ontological status and, as a result, it is not to being-in-itself taken in itself that Sartre must turn to find the ontological context out of which arises radical diversity and change.

There is a possible objection to this conclusion, one which might not only lead one to assume that Sartre can find radical diversity and change in being-in-itself, but also lead to the conclusion that, through the structure which Sartre has granted to being-in-itself, one can avoid the appeal to nothingness as the ontological foundation of radical diversity and change. Being-in-itself is the being of phenomena and the phenomena as such require no explanation for their diversity and change. One might conclude from this that radical diversity and change can be found in being-in-itself taken in itself. But such an argument overlooks one important thing. Radical diversity and change are ontologically posterior to, and are only significant in relation to, determinateness. Radical diversity is the difference which exists between determinate beings taken at the level of their most fundamental essence, not a difference between the fluid phenomena. Radical change is a transformation of the most fundamental essence of a determinate being through which it becomes a different determinate being, not simply the fluidity of phenomena. One must conclude, therefore, that radical diversity and change must be grounded in a context which extends beyond simple being-in-itself, a context which includes the nihilating activity of being-for-itself.

But the structure of being-in-itself, as Sartre envisions it, is important to the foundation of radical diversity and change. If being-in-itself were a necessary being or if it contained its own possibility, one would have to look within the necessity or the possibility of being-in-itself for the source of any change or diversity which might be contained in reality. If it were a necessary being its diversity and change would be deterministic. If it were a possible being its diversity and change would be contained in it as potentialities. In neither case would change and diversity be of the radical sort. For Sartre, however, the being of being-in-itself is contingent and, therefore, susceptible to radical diversity and change.

Determinateness arises for Sartre in human knowledge. Human knowledge is the result of the presence of being-for-itself to being-in-itself. It is, for Sartre, a state of being-for-itself.[1] One cannot infer from this that determinateness has only an epistemological status, for in knowing being-for-itself constitutes the reality of the world taken as the human situation.

As Sartre sees it, determination is negation. In the known it exists as an external negation of the form, X is not Y. External negation occurs in being-in-itself, because the negation does not enter into the being of the entities distinguished, but it cannot be founded by being-in-itself, since by definition being-in-itself is beyond negation.

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[1] Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 179.

External negation, then, for Sartre requires a prior internal negation. Internal negation is founded upon being-for-itself's nihilating activity. Being-for-itself, because of the fissure in its being, finds itself in the condition of not-being in relation to the plenitude which is being-in-itself. This internal negation, arising out of the being of being-for-itself, creates the possibility of external negation of being-in-itself which in turn creates the determinateness which is the world taken as the human situation.[2]

But how does being-for-itself bring determinateness to being-in-itself? Sartre's answer is that it does so in its presence to being-in-itself. Determinateness, as Sartre sees it, is a 'this' which stands against a totality. Determinateness is created when being-for-itself's presence to being-in-itself establishes the totality and the 'this.' Being-for-itself discovers itself as a detotalized totality. In its presence to being-in-itself, it creates the totality which it lacks. Only consciousness has the power to found a totality, because a totality results only when there is nothingness at its limits. A detotalized totality, then, is required that a totality come into being.[3] The 'this' only appears against a background of totality. It occurs as an accent of negation. This accent, for Sartre, is a negation of the totality resulting from the negation by being-for-itself of itself as a detotalized totality. The relation between these two negations remains fluid so that the 'this' can be reabsorbed into the totality.[4]

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[2] _Ibid_., pp. 172-178. [3] _Ibid_., pp. 180-182.

The 'this' taken against the totality gives to Sartre's ontology a determinateness containing within it a radical diversity between the determinate entities. The 'this' as a determinate entity does not arise from a homogeneous substratum by virtue of some necessary law and, hence, its diversity cannot be reduced to the status of illusion or subsumed under an original homogeneity. It arises instead out of an act of creativity on the part of being-for-itself, an act bringing something out of nothing. For Sartre, then, the diversity in the world taken as the human situation is a radical diversity.

Sartre uses the terms abolition and apparition to describe how change, as it is taken in this essay, occurs in the world of the human situation. Abolitions and apparitions cannot be accounted for through being-in-itself because they are changes in determinate being. An apparition or an abolition in a determinate being, Sartre claims, must be such that that determinate being both be and not be at the same time. Being-in-itself cannot support such a context. Abolition and apparition, he concludes, must be dependent upon being-for-itself. An apparition is an upsurge wherein a 'this' is discovered and an abolition is an annihilation of a 'this.' As a result they are dependent upon the structure of being-for-itself as a detotalized totality. But there is more to apparitions and abolitions than this. They require a temporal dimension. They can only appear to a being which is aware of a 'before' and an 'after.' As was demonstrated above, in Sartre's system temporality achieves reality only by the operation of being-for-itself. Hence, the being of apparition and abolition must be envisioned to be dependent in two ways upon the structure of being-for-itself, that is, upon its being as a detotalized totality and upon its temporal being.[5] Again it is clear that change in Sartre's ontology is radical change and that Sartre has provided an account of its being through the creative act of being-for-itself's nihilation of itself.

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[4] Ibid., pp. 182-186.

It is clear from all this that Sartre has succeeded in making of objectivity a proper stage for the drama of valuation. It was demonstrated in Chapter II that the particular values which make up the structure of value taken as a whole are such that they can be paired as polar opposites and that each member of such a pair stands in a relationship of directedness to the other member. It was also demonstrated that, if value structured in this way were to be predicable of the objective pole of reality, then radical diversity and change must be granted ontological status. Sartre has so constructed his ontology of objectivity. If the 'this' taken against the totality is the basis for determinateness in objectivity, then, the diversity which exists between the 'thises' is the radical diversity necessary that both members of each opposed pair of values can be predicable of objectivity, without the assumption that one member of such paired values be predicated of something illusory. What is of prime importance here is that the process which for Sartre establishes such an objectivity is dependent upon a creative agent with nothingness at the heart of its being. The creative agent being-for-itself brings into being a determinateness containing the character of radical diversity out of the nothingness which makes that creative agent a detotalized totality. The directedness which is found in each set of paired values also finds its ground in Sartre's conception of objectivity. Apparitions and abolitions are radical changes in objectivity. Radical change opens the possibility that negative value predications might be replaced by positive ones. Directedness as a part of the structure of value itself is at the minimum a hope for such a change and at the maximum, in the case of moral goodness and badness, a command for action to bring about change. In order for value to find its ground in the objective pole of reality, radical change must have ontological status. Apparitions and abolitions provide this in Sartre's ontology. And here again Sartre makes use of the structure of the creative agent which has nothingness at the heart of its being. His ontological analysis of temporality, its genesis in the structure of being-for-itself and its imposition on objectivity in the act of knowing, provide the basis for his explanation of how radical change depends upon creativity and nothingness.

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[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207.

One might wish to object to the assertion that Sartre has provided a proper stage for the drama of valuation. From the fact that being-for-itself, the being of subjectivity, is the source of the determinateness and radical diversity and change of objective being, one might infer that the being of the ground of value has only subjective and, therefore, illusory status. It is true that being-for-itself has a constituting relation to the phenomena. But the objection assumes a Kantian context which Sartre does not accept. Being-in-itself is the being of phenomena and it is the phenomena which constitute objective being. It must be concluded, therefore, that Sartre's analysis does establish a theory of determinateness, and radical diversity and change, with sufficient objectivity to permit objectivity to function as the ground for the act of valuation.

Sartre has provided for a proper stage for the activity of valuation, but by the same metaphysical structure that he does he also insures the solitude of man. All knowledge for Sartre is fundamentally external negation. It can be said to consist fundamentally of divions made in being-in-itself. These divisions, of course, refer back to the internal negation by being-for-itself of itself. As a result, Sartre claims knowledge to be a realization, using the term in two of its senses. Knowledge realizes objective being, that is, it makes it what it is and not what it is not. But at the same time knowledge is a realization on the part of being-for-itself that the source of this knowledge is being-for-itself's not-being.[6] A more specific account of this same situation has been found in Sartre's account of the genesis of the 'this' and the totality. As was explained above, the totality and the 'this' come into being by the action of being-for-itself upon being-in-itself. Being-in-itself is discovered as a totality by being-for-itself because it is itself a detotalized totality. This 'this' is that part of being-in-itself which is discovered by being-for-itself as that being which in the present it is not.[7] Again it is clear that, for Sartre, knowledge is fundamentally being-for-itself's not-being. The not-being of being-for-itself which is at the center of knowledge is relative not-being. Being-for-itself is not the 'this' and it is not the totality. But, as was demonstrated in the last chapter, all negations refer to being-for-itself's presence to itself which contains an absolute not-being. As a consequence, one must look upon knowledge in Sartre's metaphysic as a further substantiation of the solitude of man.

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[6] Ibid., pp. 179-180.

In evaluating Sartre's position, this discussion must return to an analysis made in the last chapter, the analysis of Sartre's conception of creativity. It was asserted there that Sartre depends upon creativity in both its negative and positive aspects to account for the genesis of certain of the structures of his ontology, but that in his structuring of the creative agent, being-for-itself, he introduces only the negative aspect. The same criticism applies in this more specific aspect of Sartre's ontology. Determinateness arises in the interaction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself, but the fundamental source is being-for-itself. The totality arises when being-for-itself presents being-in-itself with the nothingness which is at the heart of its being to function as the limit of the

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[7] _Ibid._, pp. 181-184.

totality. The 'this' arises when being-for-itself, in a second negation, selects a part of that totality as the being which it in particular is not. It is clear from this how the negative aspect of creativity is involved in the being of determinateness. But an examination of what is involved in determinateness will reveal that the positive aspect of creativity is also needed. The formation of the totality cannot be the simple result of the addition of nothingness to being-in-itself, for this would lead only to the cancellation of the plenitude of being-in-itself. It requires a juxtaposition of being-in-itself with nothingness. This entails a reassertion of being-in-itself against the nothingness which is to bound it. This reassertion of the being of being-in-itself requires the positive aspect of creativity, an aspect of creativity which Sartre is unwilling to give to his creative agent, being-for-itself. A similar set of circumstances surround the formation of the 'this.' In order for a segment of being-in-itself taken as a totality to come into being as a 'this,' more is required of being-for-itself than its negation. It must also posit the being of the 'this' against that negation. Such an activity also calls for the positive aspect to creativity, which Sartre is unwilling to admit.

II. VALUATION

It was demonstrated in Chapter I that it is impossible for the being of value to be reduced to any characteristic or set of characteristics in objective reality, nor could it be reduced to a subjective condition mechanically caused. In Chapter II it was demonstrated that value is brought into being out of nothingness in an act of creativity within the subjective realm of being. In this section it will be necessary to examine being-for-itself, paying particular attention to its transcendence, to determine how Sartre explains valuation.

In his only attempt to give a definition to the term "value," Sartre characterizes it as an ideal which contains a demand for foundation in being. However, the demand implicit in a 'value' is such, in Sartre's conception, that it can never be met, since such an event would dissolve the ideal's status as a 'value.'[8] Sartre is not using the term "value" in the same way that it is being used in this essay. He is using it to refer to things which are valued in the state of being valued. Yet from Sartre's definition of valued things one can derive an understanding of his conception of value taken in itself. An ideal valued is one which is demanded. Hence, the characteristic of demand must be an aspect of value itself as Sartre would conceive it. An ideal, in so much as it is valued, must be lacked. Hence, for Sartre, the characteristic of lack is an aspect of value itself. One can see from this construction of a conception of value for Sartre that at least intrinsic values are limited to the realm of the positive, for there can never be a demand for something which is bad, ugly or unjust. From this analysis one can correctly project the hypothesis that, for Sartre, the being of value is to be found in the context of being-for-itself's attempt to find for itself a foundation.

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[8] *Ibid*., p. 38.

As a demand value requires for its being a being which can affirm the demand and act upon it. As Sartre sees it, such a being must be an active freedom. It cannot be the case that values are prior to and make necessary the action of the free being-for-itself, because a thing valued is always an ideal which is lacked and the lacked presupposes a project in order that it might reveal itself as such.[9] Thus, for Sartre it is in a project created *ex nihilo* by being-for-itself in its transcendence that the being of value is to be found. It is to an analysis of this that this essay must turn.

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[9] *Ibid*.

The analysis of the project starts for Sartre with some observations about action. An action is defined by Sartre as an attempt to change the world according to an end by the arrangement of means.[10] Under such a definition there can be no such things as accidental actions. Although he need not be aware of all the consequences of the actions he takes, one always intends the actions he takes. Action, therefore, must be viewed as a transcending intentionality in the same way as is knowledge. A double nihilation is involved in action. The first is a nihilation wherein an ideal state of affairs is presented as an absolute not-being. In the second the actual situation is posited as an absolute not-being in relation to the ideal state of affairs.[11] For Sartre it follows from this that there is no external motivation to the action of being-for-itself and that nothing determines what the ideal sponsoring the action is to be.[12] The action of being-for-itself, therefore, is a totally free action.

This analysis of the action of being-for-itself clearly shows that Sartre wishes it to be viewed as a project of being-for-itself in which the being of value can be found. But he also wishes to move beyond this conclusion to the more profound conclusion that every particular project is a mode of the fundamental project of transcendence, namely self-foundation. From the fact that each particular project is directed towards a particular possibility, Sartre infers that there must be, corresponding to the fundamental project, an ultimate possibility. The ultimate possibility is a synthesis of all particular possibilities in an undifferentiated form. It arises out of being-for-itself's being as a detotalized totality. Being-for-itself's being as a detotalized totality conditions the fundamental project of transcendence. Because it is a detotalized totality, being-for-itself turns to being-in-itself to find a foundation upon which it could be as a totality. The ultimate possibility arises as a result. But, as was demonstrated in the analysis of determinateness, there is for Sartre no _a priori_ determinateness in being-in-itself. Individual 'thises' arise against their respective totalities in a free act of being-for-itself. The result is that the ultimate possibility, as the correlate to the fundamental project, is a totally undifferentiated possibility.[13]

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 433. [11] *Ibid.*, pp. 433-435.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 435-436.

From what has just been shown it is a short jump to the realization that, for Sartre, it is the choice of determinate ends which is the central aspect of being-for-itself's action. The fundamental project of being-for-itself is established from within the structure of its being as a detotalized totality. But from the point of view of being-for-itself this fundamental project must be taken up in the context of a particular project, for even in an act of reflective consciousness it has only a non-positional awareness of the fundamental project. Positionally, consciousness is aware of the world taken as the human situation. For Sartre, then, the choice of an end, that is, the choice of a particular possibility, is central to the action of being-for-itself.[14] One might infer from what has just been stated that choice comes in the light of a determinate world, necessitating the inference that the transcendence wherein determinateness is ascribed to the world is different from and prior to that in which choice is made. But this is not a correct interpretation of Sartre. There is only one transcendence by being-for-itself. In the same act the world is constituted and the particular project chosen. It is through the choice of ends that the world is constituted as the human situation. One can see, then, why for Sartre consciousness is choice.[15] Because the ultimate possibility out of which consciousness chooses a particular possibility as its end is completely undifferentiated, choice must be conceived to be totally free. For Sartre choice is the fundamental exercise of the freedom of being-for-itself.[16] Through its freedom of choice, being-for-itself determines a particular end for itself and, because this choice is the fundamental exercise of its transcendence, determines the shape of the world taken as the human situation.

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[13] _Ibid._, pp. 460-461.

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[14] Ibid., pp. 461-462. [15] Ibid., p. 462.

Sartre is sometimes criticised for his conception of choice. The criticism revolves around the fact that choice is usually conceived to occur against a given situation, while for Sartre it is prior to the situation.[17] If a philosopher can be required to use words in their ordinary contexts, this criticism is valid. If he is not, then from within the contexts of Sartre's metaphysic the use of the term choice is appropriate to the circumstances in which it is used. Since being-for-itself is radically free and because being-in-itself is unable to provide the situation out of which a choice might be made, it is readily conceivable that it is in a choice that an end is determined which in turn determines its own situation. The criticism is clearly dependent upon taking Sartre's conception of choice out of the context of his ontology.

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[16] Ibid., pp. 462-463.

[17] Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1954), pp. 166-169.

Sartre does not have an explicit theory for the being of value, but it is clear that there is a theory implicit in his ontology. It is in being-for-itself's free choice of ends that value comes into being. Sartre has defined the valued thing as an ideal which places a demand for foundation upon the world. This demand comes into being only when a choice of ends has been made. Sartre has also characterized the valued thing as an ideal which cannot be granted that foundation without losing its status of being valued. Because choice is the selection of a particular possibility for the future, it must be in choice that the characteristic of value of being lacked is established. It must be made clear that the end chosen is not itself value as the term is taken in this essay. What is chosen is an ideal. But, according to Sartre's conception, in the choice of an end, being-for-itself puts that ideal into the state of being valued and in so doing creates the being of value itself.

The value which comes into being through choice alone is intrinsic value. Because being-for-itself stands in the relationship of facticity to being-in-itself, this same choice creates certain extrinsic values. When being-for-itself makes a choice of ends, being-in-itself takes on the status of a situation, the situation in which the project entailed in the choice is to be undertaken. This situation is what is revealed in the transcending intentionality taken as knowledge. But the situation is not completely conditioned by the transcendence by being-for-itself. It is also conditioned by being-for-itself's facticity, i.e., its particular relationship to being-in-itself.[18]

Sartre provides a set of categories into which can be fitted the extrinsic values. These categories do not classify the extrinsic values themselves but the things valued. This classification is based upon the ways in which facticity affects being-for-itself's creation of the situation. The first category is that of place. Being-for-itself's place is either an exile from or a favored location for the achievement of the end.[19] An extrinsic value arises in being-for-itself's confrontation with its place as a part of its situation because of this. The second category is the past. The past takes on a value in the light of the end which being-for-itself in the present chooses.[20] The present environment is the third category. The environment in relation to the choice made by being-for-itself contains the utilizable instrumentality, that is, the mechanism for achieving the chosen goal, and the coefficient of adversity, that is, the set of elements which must be overcome that the end might be achieved.[21] The fellowman presents the fourth category. The fellowman is the source of a set of techniques, not created by being-for-itself, for the fulfilling of the project which it has chosen.[22]

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[18] Sartre, _op_. _cit_., pp. 481-489. [19] _Ibid_., p. 493.

[20] _Ibid_., pp. 498-499. [21] _Ibid_., pp. 507-509.

Sartre provides two other categories for things extrinsically valued. They are, like the others, the result of being-for-itself's facticity, but as limits on the situation, not as elements conditioning it. The first of these is again the fellowman, operating in this case, in the role of the other. As an other the fellowman makes an object of being-for-itself. This causes an alienation of being-for-itself from its situation and makes of the chosen end an unrealizable to it.[23] In its confrontation with its fellowman, acting in the capacity of an other, extrinsic values arise. The final category is death. Death makes of the chosen end an unrealizable because it too acts as a limit on the situation in which that end is sought.[24] It too, then, becomes an object in confrontation with which being-for-itself brings extrinsic value into being.

The values so far discussed have involved those instances in which the world appears as an instrumentality. For Sartre there are occasions in which being-for-itself confronts the world as a non-instrumental totality. This is, to Sartre, the genesis of emotion.[25] In an emotion consciousness magically changes the world because the world is taken as dangerous. It accomplishes this by removing the distance between itself and the world, degrading itself to the level of the body and its behavior. In the case of emotion consciousness is not positionally aware of its own degradation. It is positionally aware of the world as degraded from its status as an instrumentality to that of a non-instrumental totality.[26] In his theory of emotion Sartre has presented an entirely new source for values. The values created are created in the defeat of the project of being-for-itself. When consciousness confronts the world as something which is a non-instrumental totality, it confronts something which is valued in a certain way, the particular value being determined by the particular emotion felt. The value is not the non-instrumentality of the world itself. The non-instrumental totality is the thing which is valued. The value taken in itself comes into being as an element in consciousness' confrontation with the world as such.

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 523. [23] *Ibid.*, pp. 526-527.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 547-548.

It was asserted in Chapter II that the subjectivity which functioned as the source for the being of value also suffered ontological anxieties. Sartre's theory of anguish parallels that correlation. In reflection being-for-itself becomes aware that the possibility which it has chosen as its end is totally dependent for its being an end upon its being chosen by being-for-itself. It is not dependent upon motives out of the past nor does it have any efficacy in the future. In its awareness of this fact reflection is in anguish.[27] In accord with what was asserted in Chapter II, Sartre has constructed a theory of anguish demonstrating its co-presence with the being of value. It is in the choice of a particular possibility that value comes into being, and it is the status of that chosen possibility which in reflection creates the primary ontological anxiety, anguish.

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[25] Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp. 89-90.

[26] Ibid., pp. 70-71 and 73-81.

What must now be demonstrated is the manner in which Sartre makes use of creativity and nothingness in his implicit theory of value. Both of the terms enter into the process at two points. In Sartre's ontology value comes into being as being-for-itself chooses a particular possibility as its end from the ultimate possibility. The ultimate possibility, as the correlate of being-for-itself as a detotalized totality, must be viewed as a creation by being-for-itself, for it is not an element of being-in-itself. Being-for-itself is a detotalized totality because in its presence to itself it discovers nothingness in its ontological structure. It follows from this that Sartre's explanation of the ontological status of the ultimate possibility entails a creativity bringing forth a novelty out of nothingness. The choice of a particular possibility is a creative act on the part of being-for-itself; and because the ultimate possibility out of which the particular possibility is chosen is totally undifferentiated, the choice is a choice from nothingness. It must be emphasized that, for Sartre, this process does not occur in two steps. It is a single event. Nevertheless, it is clear that creativity and nothingness enter into Sartre's implicit theory of value in these two ways.

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[27] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 30-32.

Because nothingness is a fundamental ontological element for the being of value, it must also be a fundamental element in the realization of anguish. For Sartre, it is because there is nothingness between being-for-itself and the future that anguish can exist.[28] This relationship between anguish and nothingness correlates with that between nothingness and value because in Sartre's ontology value comes into being when a possibility is chosen, a possibility which exists as the promise of the future.

As was stated earlier, values have at least the potential of providing the basis for a relationship between the individual man and his world. As a result, if Sartre's theory of valuation is to be consistent with his goal of substantiating the existential awareness, then that theory must contain within it a principle by virtue of which values must fail in establishing this relationship. This does not mean that values are finally to be conceived to be unreal, but simply that they cannot found such a relationship. For Sartre values come into being in being-for-itself's attempt to locate a foundation for its being. This attempt is carried out in the project of being-for-itself. The project consists in an effort by being-for-itself to actualize a chosen possibility. If the project could be successful, then the individual being-for-itself in actualizing a chosen possibility would have established an essence for its own existence, i.e., a self-value. However, as was demonstrated in the last chapter, for Sartre self-value and possibility are only promises of the future existing in the mode of not-yet, and the reality of the future depends upon the temporal *ekstasis*. As Sartre envisions the temporal *ekstasis*, it is an essential gap in reality which refers back to the original fissure in the being of being-for-itself. The result of this is that the promises of the future can never be actualized. This means that the chosen possibility and the self-value can never be actualized, which entails, consequently, that the project of being-for-itself must be a failure. Therefore, although for Sartre values do come into existence at the initiation of the project by choice, they cannot provide the relationships which would overcome the solitude of man.

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

The significance of this aspect of Sartre's ontology bears upon the meaning of the ontological anxieties. Anguish is not simply a threat which the individual feels in his role as the source of value for the world. For Sartre it goes beyond that. In his system anguish is the reflective realization of the absolute meaninglessness of the project in which value comes into being.

Three topics present themselves as ground for criticism of Sartre's theory of valuation. The first topic is emotion. In his theory of emotion Sartre is critical of empirically generated theories of emotion because their result is nothing more than a set of facts about emotions. A proper theory, as he sees it, must start with an analysis of man as he confronts the world. Hence, for Sartre anthropology must precede a psychology of emotion.[29] Sartre is certainly justified in calling for a general theory to function as the basis of explanation of emotion. But any time a theory, be it scientific or metaphysical, is introduced prior to the accumulation of facts, it runs the risk of failing to give a proper account of the facts. There are grounds for assuming that Sartre's theory fails in this way. No attempt will be made here to enumerate the known facts about human emotions. However, in looking at Sartre's theory of emotion one must notice that the emotions are reduced to the status of a negative reaction by a man to his being in the world. For Sartre an emotion is a remaking of the world into a non-instrumental totality through the body for purposes of escaping the danger which the world contains.[30] One is hard pressed to accept such a conception of emotion in light of the fact that emotions seem to accompany occasions in which the world appears to be accommodating to the human presence. Sartre provides no explanation why such occasions should be considered either as not actually eliciting emotion or as being, beneath the appearance, actually rejections of the world because of the danger it holds.

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[29] Sartre, Emotions, pp. 16-21.

The second topic is the being of value. Value comes into being in Sartre's ontology in the project of being-for-itself. Because of this, value must be conceived to possess a very limited context. It was seen in the examination of the project that Sartre has an implicit theory of intrinsic and extrinsic value. But this theory limits the structure of value taken as a whole to the simple structure of value and disvalue. Intrinsic value comes into being upon the choice of an end. In predicating a value for the chosen end, one is limited to the value predicate goodness. Extrinsic value comes into being as being-for-itself confronts its situation. Extrinsic value entails a structure containing both value and disvalue. But in confronting its situation, being-for-itself is entitled to predicate only goodness and badness of the elements of its situation, place, past, environment, the fellowman and death. Thus, in limiting the creative act of being-for-itself to the project of self-foundation, Sartre has set a limit on the possible richness of value taken as a whole. Such a limit is not inconceivable but does provide some ground for the judgment that Sartre's ontology of valuation is unacceptable.

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[30] Ibid., pp. 86 and 90.

The third topic is a familiar one, creativity. It is clear that the project wherein value comes into being is an act of creativity. There are two moments in this particular creative act, the bringing into being of the ultimate possibility and the choice of a particular possibility as an ideal end. The critical theme is also a familiar one: Sartre cannot account for the project of being-for-itself in the way that he does, unless he is willing to admit some notion of the positive aspect of creativity. Analysis of three elements in the project will verify this conclusion.

The first analysis concerns the character of detotalized totality, which Sartre claims defines being-for-itself, and which is the source of the ultimate possibility. The criticism appropriate here is the same as was leveled earlier in this chapter. Being-for-itself cannot be characterized as a detotalized totality without predicating more of being-for-itself than its relation to nothingness, i.e., its negative aspect.

The second analysis concerns the ultimate possibility. If Sartre were correct in his assertion that the ultimate possibility were derivable directly from nothingness, then only the negative aspect of creativity would be needed to account for its ontological status. It is quite true to say that only nothingness has infinite possibility. This is what is at the basis of Aquinas' claim that pure potentiality must be absolute not-being. But it does not follow from this that possibility arises out of nothingness, for it is only in relation to its becoming something that nothingness can be said to have possibility. The becoming of something out of nothingness requires a creativity with a positive aspect to bring a novel something out of nothingness. Hence, the ontological status of the ultimate possibility depends on both the positive and negative aspects of creativity.

The third analysis concerns Sartre's conception of choice. According to Sartre's reasoning, choice is the most proximate element to the event of valuation. Value comes into being because being-for-itself chooses from the ultimate possibility a particular possibility as its ideal. This ideal provides the source of a possible essence for being-for-itself. At first glance it appears obvious that choice entails a positive aspect to the creative agent. Sartre's reason for doubting this is that the chosen possibility exists as a lacked ideal and as such exists as a nothingness. The point is, however, that it does exist. The fact that it remains a lacked ideal does not negate the fact that it is a positive product of creativity, entailing the conclusion that being-for-itself cannot be defined simply as a being which exists without an essence. From these three analyses the conclusion clearly follows that Sartre cannot have his conception of the project of being-for-itself without crediting being-for-itself not only with the negative aspect of creativity, its brotherhood with nothingness, but also with a positive aspect through which some novel element arises out of and stands against nothingness.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY

The basic objective of this essay is to achieve a better understanding of the requirements which must be placed upon an ontology in order that it might provide a context for the explanation of the being of human values. The particular being which is being sought is the being which founds all varieties of value predication.

Two separate analyses are undertaken. One is a general attempt to locate the terms necessary to an ontology which could provide the basis for an explanation of the being of value. This analysis concerns itself with two separate realms: the realm of ordinary linguistic usage and the metaphysical realm. The other analysis deals specifically with Sartre's ontology, with the goal of establishing how these terms and their relationships can be structured that human values might have an explainable ontological status.

An examination of ordinary usage produces the conclusion that values cannot be reduced to characteristics of objects or to direct effects which objects have on a subject. Stevenson demonstrates this by showing that the situation surrounding the use of value predications is such that their use depends upon some sort of magnetism of value predicates themselves, and that there are a significant number of cases when disputants in a value controversy can hold identical beliefs about the facts involved and differ in their value predication without either being unreasonable. Stevenson's conclusion is that value predication is a function of differences in attitude and is not cognitive. This essay accepts the subjective status of value predications but enters the metaphysical realm in an attempt to demonstrate their intelligibility.

It can be shown that values cannot be derived in a rationalistic account of subjectivity, a metaphysic constructed upon the basis of immutable essences and the law of identity. Values cannot be contained in the immutable essence of any ontological subjectivity, human or divine, short of the postulation of some value term as part of that essence.

A non-rationalistic metaphysic possesses the potential for providing the basis of the explanation of the being of value. The being of value places certain requirements upon the objective pole of reality as its ground and upon the subjective pole of reality as its source. Certain things can be seen in the structure of value taken as a whole which lead to the conclusion that, if objectivity is to provide a ground for value, it must have a radical diversity and change which penetrate to the core of its being. The particular values which constitute value taken as a whole can be arranged for the most part in pairs of polar opposites. If these values can be predicated of objectivity, the diversity of objectivity must go beyond illusion, even beyond a diversity between modes of a being which has a more fundamental and homogeneous essence. In value taken as a whole there is also a directedness existing between the members of each pair of polar opposites. If values are predicable of objectivity taken on the level of its most profound essences, then the change necessary to ground the directedness of value cannot be illusory or limited to changes in the modes of a being with a permanent essence on the more basic level. A similar situation surrounds the subjectivity as the source of values. Value is not a direct effect upon subjectivity by an object. It is the result of a free reaction by subjectivity. Consequently, the same radical diversity and change must characterize subjective being.

In providing a metaphysic which permits radical diversity and change, two terms must be introduced, nothingness and creativity. An inversion of the Parmenidean argument demonstrates that if radical diversity is to be permitted then nothingness must stand between any two radically diverse beings. The same type of argument shows that if radical change is to be permitted something must come out of nothingness. However, as Parmenides shows, the term nothingness, taken in itself, is inconceivable. To provide a place for nothingness in an ontological structure, it is first necessary to introduce the term creativity. Creativity has this effect upon nothingness because any creative agent must be conceived in such a way as to bring something out of nothingness. Creativity is also a necessary element in the founding of radical diversity and change because radical diversity and change require more than nothingness for their being. They require for their explanation the positive aspect of creativity to bring novelty out of nothingness.

The turn to the analysis of Sartre has the goal of bringing a better understanding of how nothingness and creativity must be structured in order that the being of value might be explained. Sartre's ontology does not have this specific goal. In fact a theory of value is only implicitly contained in his ontological analysis, which has as its primary goal the substantiation of the existential awareness of the solitude of man. However, Sartre's ontology does attempt to structure creativity and nothingness and does contain an implicit theory of valuation relating to these terms. Hence, an examination of this ontology can further the understanding of the ontology of value.

Being-for-itself is the creative agent in Sartre's ontology. Being-for-itself makes objectivity into a human situation. In doing so the world is given determinateness and value. Being-for-itself also provides ontological support for nothingness. Indeed, for Sartre it is because being-for-itself supports nothingness that it is able to constitute objectivity as the human situation. Being-for-itself is consciousness. Consciousness is intentionality. As pure intentionality consciousness contains no essence. It intends essences. But consciousness is non-positionally aware of its own existence without essence. With respect to its essence being-for-itself is nothingness. This is how nothingness gains ontological status.

But for Sartre creativity is not the only ontological element. There is also a being-in-itself. Being-in-itself is the being of the phenomena. It is the realm of essences which being-for-itself intends. Taken in itself being-in-itself is pure plenitude and as such does not contain the source of determinateness or value. Determinateness and value are the result of the dialectical interaction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself.

Determinateness is, for Sartre, a 'this' taken against a totality. Being-for-itself possesses the characteristic of a detotalized totality, which allows it to give to being-in-itself the status of a totality. Determinateness is a characteristic of objectivity and comes into being against the ground of being-in-itself taken as a totality.

Determinateness, for Sartre, is an external negation, a negation of the totality. The result of this negation is the 'this.' The 'this' comes into being as a particular thing which the being-for-itself is not, through an internal negation of being-for-itself. Determinateness, as Sartre has accounted for it, entails the reality of diversity and change. Hence, it provides an adequate ground for valuation.

The constitution of being-in-itself as a determinate situation is the result of being-for-itself's transcendence. Being-for-itself is always in a state of transcendence from being-in-itself because its structure entails an ontological separation from being-in-itself. The fundamental mode of transcendence, for Sartre, is the project. The project is an attempt by being-for-itself to create an essence for itself. The first element in Sartre's analysis is being-for-itself taken as a detotalized totality. The detotalized totality is being-for-itself's ultimate possibility. Ultimate possibility is absolutely undifferentiated. Because being-for-itself is nothing there is nothing which it cannot be, or at least attempt to be. This is the ultimate possibility of being-for-itself. The project of being-for-itself consists in a choice of a particular possibility as the goal for its action. The choice creates the being of value. The goal chosen is the thing intrinsically valued. Extrinsic values arise against objectivity according to how the contingencies of an individual being-for-itself's relationship to being-in-itself, its facticity, affect the movement towards that goal.

The determinateness in the world taken as the human situation and the project of being-for-itself do not provide the basis of man's communication with the world, but instead frame what is always possible but cannot be. Because being-for-itself in its fundamental structure has no essence, it must always stand apart from the determinateness which it imposes upon the world and from the completion of the project which defines it.

In this essay three lines of criticism have been raised against Sartre's ontological analysis. The first concerns the postulates upon which Sartre's ontology is based, but which he does not appear to recognize as such. Like many other metaphysicians Sartre wants to found his ontology upon certitude. This he cannot do because important epistemological and ontological principles are based upon postulates. The first two postulates are epistemological. For Sartre consciousness is intentionality. This assertion has proven to be highly functional in certain circles of philosophy. It allows Sartre to deny that consciousness has a content and, as a consequence, that it has an essence. The second postulate is the assertion that consciousness as intentionality is non-positionally aware of itself. This postulate along with the first provide Sartre with epistemological support for his introduction of nothingness which is so important to his ontology. The final three postulates are ontological. Sartre's assertion that consciousness is a distinct mode of being, being-for-itself, is a postulate. The fact that it functions in Sartre's analysis as a postulate proves that Sartre is unable to produce a metaphysic from epistemological principles alone. Sartre's ontological proof for the existence of the being of the phenomena simply does not prove what it attempts to prove. The assertion, then, that consciousness intends being-in-itself, or, what amounts to the same thing, that there is a being-in-itself must exist in Sartre's analysis as a postulate. The final postulate is the assertion that there is a relationship between the being-for-itself and the being-in-itself wherein the former is affected by the latter's contingency, being-for-itself's facticity. Nowhere in Sartre's analysis is there deduced a principle according to which monadism can be denied. Yet he does deny it and, hence, facticity must be introduced into his ontological analysis as a postulate. Sartre's attempt to ground his ontology upon epistemological certitude, then, is frustrated by the existence of these epistemological and ontological postulates.

The second line of criticism concerns the general poverty of human being for Sartre. Common sense tells us that human emotions and humanly generated values are very complex aspects of human being. It is possible to entertain the hypothesis that language is barren when compared to the emotions and values which it tries to enumerate. Sartre assumes emotion to be merely a reaction by consciousness through its body upon the discovery that the world is dangerous. His implicit theory of valuation limits value taken as a whole to a structure of simple positive intrinsic value and simple positive and negative extrinsic value. To those who demand a greater richness to their conception of human being, Sartre's conclusions about emotion and value might prove to be grounds for the rejection of the foundations in his ontology.

The most serious line of criticism concerns Sartre's explanation of the creative agent. Sartre demonstrates a good grasp of the negative aspect of creativity, its association with nothingness. But he also wants to permit to that creative agent, being-for-itself, constituting powers. In several places in this essay, it has been demonstrated that Sartre cannot give being-for-itself these constituting powers short of granting to it the positive aspect of creativity, whereby nothingness is changed into something. Sartre is clearly avoiding the positive aspect of creativity because he is afraid that with it he will provide the ground for a synthesis wherein the solitude of man might be overcome. But this is not necessary, for any creative agent must be conceived to nihilate being at the same time that it creates it. If creativity were to lose its relationship with nothingness it would no longer be creativity. As thus conceived there is still room to constitute the conception of creativity such that it may overcome its solitude at the moment of creation or, as Sartre wishes to do, constitute the conception such that the creation is always in a transcendental realm, in such a way that it is beyond consoling the creator.

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VITAE

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